

JPRS-TAC-93-020
1 November 1993



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Arms Control

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JPRS-TAC-93-020

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Long March 4 Rocket To Be Displayed at Shanghai Fair

*HK2309145593 Hong Kong WEN WEI PO in Chinese
23 Sep 93 p 6*

[Article by Chao Wen-hua (6392 2429 7520): "To Be Among the First To See Long March Four Rocket"]

[Text] During the Second Science and Technology Festival held in October, the Shanghai New China Machine-Building Factory will, for the first time, exhibit a genuine Long March Four rocket to the public. On 3 September, this reporter had the opportunity, with other first viewers, to see the Long March Number rocket.

The New China Machine-Building Factory is the general factory which designed and assembled the Long March carrier rocket. The rocket lay across the workshop and on its white shell were printed eight eye-catching Chinese characters: "China's Air Space; Long March Four." Qian Jinghan, senior engineer and director of the general assembly workshop for the carrier rocket gave us a briefing. The Long March Four has three stages in all. It is 41.89 m long with a maximum width of 3.35 m. Its structural weight is 17 tonne and its launch weight is 250 tonne (including launch fuel). The first stage of the rocket is 29 m long and has four jet engines each with a thrust of 75 tonne. The jet engines are responsible for adjusting flight direction and posture and can make the rocket rock and roll. The flames we see during launch are jetting out of the four trumpet-shaped nozzles. At the same time, they act like the rudder of a ship, so they are called gas rudders. Two seconds after they are ignited, the jet engines can reach the designed thrust and the rocket will then take off. They consume 1.2 tonne of fuel per second. The work of the third stage will only last for two and a half minutes and then it will automatically be detached and drop away. At the same time, its work is taken on by the second stage. Where the first and second stages meet there is a piece of iron, which has a red and white check and is slightly larger than a gentleman's hat. At its upper end is printed the words: "For Military Use.

Return to the Government for a Reward When Picked Up." Director Qian said: It is a magnetic recorder which records launch data from the time of igniting to separation. It is like a "black box" in an aircraft and it will drop alongside the third stage of the rocket. We normally make it drop within the borders of Shaanxi.

After walking past the second stage of the rocket, I came to the third stage. Director Qian said: Although the first stage is the shortest, it is the nucleus. The satellite is placed inside its cowl. When it enters a fixed orbit, the cowl will open and then the satellite will begin to work. The entire working time for the rocket, which is worth more than 20 million yuan, is only 10 and a half minutes. The entire flight is approximately 2,243 km. Although it only works for 10 minutes, we have spent 10 years on it but these years have not been spent in vain. The rocket has already successfully deployed two meteorological satellites in orbit. Moreover, it succeeded at the first attempt. This is what we call "using 10 years of effort in one day."

Customs Seize Chemical Waste Shipment

*OW1610013893 Beijing Central People's Radio
Network in Mandarin 2230 GMT 15 Oct 93*

[From the "News and Press Review" program]

[Text] Nanjing's (Xishengwei) customs recently discovered a shipment of chemical wastes which was declared and imported as fuel oil. It has been disclosed that the cargo was produced by Korea [the ROK, han guo] and sold by the (Xinjin) Macao International Limited Company.

According to a circular issued by our country in 1991 on strictly controlling the transfer of hazardous wastes to China from outside its national boundaries, the importation of any hazardous waste must be approved by the State Environmental Protection Bureau. The current shipment, which was made without permission, seriously violates the Basel Convention.

JAPAN

Tokyo To Propose International Control of Plutonium*OW2409065393 Tokyo KYODO in English 0639 GMT 24 Sep 93*

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 24 KYODO—The Science and Technology Agency decided Friday [24 September] to propose to the world a plan to put plutonium, one of the most toxic materials known, under international control, agency officials said.

Agency Chief Satsuki Eda will advance the proposal at the General Assembly of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to be held from Monday in Vienna, they said.

Under the program, all countries, including nuclear powers, would have to register all stock of plutonium and highly enriched uranium except those for military purposes and reveal their plans for using the stocks, the officials said.

Plutonium and highly enriched uranium are used to produce nuclear weapons.

If a nation has no plan to use the stocks in a certain period, the nuclear substances must be reported as a "surplus" and be stored in a special facility to be designated under the program, the officials said.

Nations to join the program would form a committee to supervise the use of the nuclear substances and to regularly make information public, they said.

The registered nuclear substances should preferably be inspected by the IAEA, but such an inspection would not be conditional under the program because nonnuclear powers are not obliged to accept such inspections, they said.

The IAEA has also been considering some form of international control of plutonium and highly enriched uranium and the United States is expected to mention such a project in announcing its new policy on nuclear nonproliferation soon.

Japan's plan is expected to differ from those of the IAEA and the U.S. on the obligation of nations to reveal the use of the nuclear substances, the officials said.

Japan has decided to allow greater transparency in its plutonium management to win international understanding of its plans to promote power generation using plutonium.

During the 134-day round trip of the Akatsuki Maru freighter to carry reprocessed plutonium from France to Japan that ended in early January, over 40 countries voiced concern about the ship passing through their territorial waters.

Japan also came under fire for its alleged reluctance to agree to an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Hata Urges Ukraine To Ratify START Treaty*OW2809045693 Tokyo KYODO in English 0345 GMT 28 Sep 93*

[Text] New York, Sept. 27 KYODO—Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata urged his Ukrainian counterpart Anatoliy Zlenko on Monday [27 September] to speedily ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Hata told Zlenko that Japan is willing to extend aid to the Ukraine for it to dismantle the hundreds of former Soviet nuclear warheads still on its soil, but Zlenko avoided a direct response on the matter, Japanese officials said.

Ukraine became a party to the 1991 start under protocols signed in 1992, but has so far refrained from ratifying it.

Zlenko indicated a wish to improve relations with Japan, saying he hopes to dispatch a team to Japan to prepare for the opening of a Ukrainian embassy in Tokyo.

Tokyo, U.S. Agree to 'Basic Studies' on Missile Defense*OW2809033893 Tokyo KYODO in English 0253 GMT 28 Sep 93*

[Text] Washington, Sept. 27 KYODO—Japan and the United States failed to agree Monday on a U.S. proposal to set up a joint working group of defense experts to develop a \$12 billion air defense system against North Korea's medium-range missiles.

Defense Agency Director General Keisuke Nakanishi told U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin that Tokyo's seven-party coalition government had problems finding a common stance on the so-called Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system that Washington wants.

It was the first bilateral meeting of defense ministers since the inauguration of the new Japanese Government in August.

The TMD system would destroy incoming missiles while they are flying through or above the atmosphere.

Nakanishi told reporters the two sides agreed to study the system within the framework of working-level consultations of defense officials. He said the consultations would be limited to "basic studies" due to Japan's constitutional restrictions on collective defense arrangements.

The Japanese and U.S. Governments earlier reported that North Korea had successfully test-fired the Nodong-1 ballistic missile, which reportedly has an estimated range of 1,000 kilometers.

The Nodong-1 is reportedly able to deliver nuclear and biological warheads. Last month, a North Korean Army officer who defected to South Korea said Pyongyang has two underground launching pads for the missiles.

Developing the TMD system for strategic purposes would cost an estimated 12 billion dollars, equal to about a quarter of the annual Japan-U.S. annual trade imbalance, over the next five years.

Aspin reportedly told Nakanishi Japan's participation in developing the system could contribute to reducing its huge trade surplus with the U.S., but Nakanishi said that Japan would consider the proposal "from a purely military angle."

Last week U.S. Undersecretary of Defense John Deutch said during a visit to Tokyo that Washington does not regard obtaining Japan's financial cooperation as a prerequisite for joint development, but expected Japan to provide its high technology in composite material manufacturing and electronics.

Nakanishi said Aspin agreed to hold long-planned cabinet-level security talks with foreign and defense ministers attending "as soon as possible." Although the idea was broached three years ago, no such talks have been held up to now.

Aspin proposed to hold the talks during an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting scheduled for mid-November in Seattle, he said.

Nakanishi told Aspin Japan hopes to upgrade United Nations peacekeeping operations, currently characterized as an auxiliary task, to one of the "main tasks" of the self-defense forces, defense agency officials said.

Aspin stressed the importance of bilateral cooperation in peacekeeping operations and suggested that more exchange of information could contribute to higher efficiency of such operations.

In reply, Nakanishi promised that Japan would "actively" promote cooperation with the U.S. in peacekeeping operations, the officials said.

VANUATU

Prime Minister Hails Progress on Testing Bans

BK1910074293 Melbourne Radio Australia in English
0500 GMT 19 Oct 93

[Text] Vanuatu's prime minister, Maxime Carlot Korman, has welcomed progress towards the treaty banning the production and use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. He was speaking in Mauritius at the fifth summit of heads of government from 47 French-speaking countries. Without mentioning China's recent underground nuclear test, Mr. Carlot Korman said other countries should take as an example France's moratorium on atomic testing at Muroroa Atoll.

The prime minister also said he hope French would be introduced as an official language for various Pacific organizations. Mr. Carlot Korman said he would particularly like to see included in the curriculum of the University of the South Pacific [USP] and also a cooperation agreement between the USP and the University Francais de Pacific based in New Caledonia.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Macedonia Accepted Into International Atomic Energy Agency

AU3009091493 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English
29 Sep 93

[Unattributed report: "Macedonia—A New Member of the Atomic Energy Agency"]

[Text] Following the recommendation of the Governors Board, the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Republic of Macedonia was unanimously admitted to this UN International Agency on 27 September 1993.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Bosnian Muslims Admit Use of Chemical Weapons

LD2310072693 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0339 GMT 23 Oct 93

[“Pool” item]

[Text] New York Oct 22 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Moslems have admitted that they are using chemical weapons in the war in the former Yugoslav republic, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia has said in a report submitted to the Security Council president.

The report, dated October 20, said the commander of the Tuzla-based 216th Brigade admitted that Bosnian Moslem forces had been using chemical weapons against Bosnian Serbs in order to 'prove the capability of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.'

Joe Sills, spokesman for the UN secretary-general, said he had heard about the report but knew no details.

On Thursday, the Bosnian Serb Army Command in Zvornik accused Moslem forces of using mortar shells filled with chlorine in their attacks on Bosnian Serbs positions around the town.

The command said that UN military observers had inspected the area and seen for themselves that the Serb allegations were true.

Bosnian Croats have also warned that Moslem forces are using war gases.

HUNGARY

'Special Emphasis' on Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction

LD2010092493 Budapest MTI in English 0853 GMT
20 Oct 93

[Text] New York, October 20 (MTI)—In its foreign policy, the Hungarian Government lays special emphasis on the limitation and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, Hungarian Deputy State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Janos Herman said in the first committee of the UN General Assembly in New York on Tuesday.

Although there are still some unsettled conflicts, and new sources of danger may also emerge, there have been some advances in international security and arms control strengthening, Herman said.

The deputy state secretary emphasized the need for the Start II agreement to be ratified as soon as possible, and adjusted to the situation which has emerged since disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Praising an agreement on the ban of chemical weapons, Herman pressed for a similar breakthrough in the field of biological warfare.

Speaking on Central and East Europe, Herman referred to the economic and social tensions which accompany transformation and may underline the process of democratic development.

The deputy state secretary noted that under such circumstances, there is a pressing need for a comprehensive approach to security. He called for the establishment of a collective system of European security in which the United Nations, the CSCE forums, the Council of Europe and the institutions of Euro-Atlantic cooperation would play a role.

Herman emphasized NATO's importance in guaranteeing security, and confirmed Hungary's intentions of joining the alliance.

He stressed that Hungary was prepared to play a more active role in UN and NATO peace-keeping. Pending its financial resources, it could begin next year training soldiers for this purpose.

[Budapest Kossuth Radio in Hungarian at 0800 GMT on 20 October carries the following related report: "Hungary would like to join NATO even though several Western leaders have been cautious with regard to extending NATO over the past weeks, following the Russian president's letter. Janos Herman, Hungarian deputy state secretary of foreign affairs, told a committee of the UN General Assembly that there is an imperative need for an overall approach to the security issue. A collective European security system should be established in which the UN, as well as the CSCE forums, the Council of Europe, and institutions of Euro-Atlantic cooperation, has a role."]

SLOVAKIA

Twenty-Five Percent Reduction in Conventional Weapons

LD2010180593 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Excerpt] A news conference was held at the Slovak Ministry of Defense on the activities of the foreign relations section. Also a part of it is the Slovak Office for Disarmament Control [Slovensky urad pre kontrolu odzbrojenia]. The topics of discussion were the inspections in connection with the reduction of conventional arms, as well as the number of persons in the Army. Representing Radiozurnal at the news conference was Bernard Hornak who has reported the following:

[Begin Hornak recording] According to Alojz Mikusiak, a member of the permanent mission of the Slovak Republic at the CSCE in Vienna, the countries that signed—according to the treaty on conventional arms and armed forces—the reduction of excessive technology [as heard], must reduce conventional weaponry by the end of this year by 25 percent of the overall number.

The Slovak Republic, within the framework of this first stage, had fulfilled the above-mentioned reduction by the end of August. For example, the number of tanks has been reduced by 147 and the number of combat armed vehicles by 181.

Representatives of the Slovak Office for Disarmament Control went on to report on some agreements and documents that the Slovak Army subscribes to. It is, above all, the Vienna document 1992, within whose framework the Slovak side has given data on military forces and arms to the CSCE. Another one is the treaty on the ban on the development and accumulation of chemical weapons. [passage omitted]

Officials Report Compliance With Disarmament Treaties

AU2410214493 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Slovak 21 Oct 93 p 1

["jv"-signed report: "Disarmament and Economy: Slovakia Is Meeting Its International Obligations"]

[Text] Bratislava—The Slovak Republic fulfilled its obligations arising from the first stage of the implementation of the Treaty on Armed Forces' Control [title as published] by the end of August. As representatives of the Slovak Defense Ministry's Foreign Relations Section and the Slovak Office for Disarmament Control (SUKO) told a news conference yesterday, the number of tanks was reduced by 151, the number of armored combat vehicles by 181, and the number of artillery systems by 199, within the framework of the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic by the end of August. The next stage, eliminating excess arms and equipment, will start in November and will be a "purely national affair" said Colonel L. Gal, director of the Slovak Defense Ministry's Foreign Relations Section. The sum of 12 million korunas has been appropriated for this purpose for this year; the exact sum required for next year will be determined on the basis of the specification of the number and types of weapons to be scrapped in the next stage. These operations are rather costly. The cost of liquidating one tank was estimated at roughly 80,000 korunas two years ago, but prices, especially energy prices, have increased dramatically since then. Yet these are not the only expenditures connected with the disarmament process. By the end of the year the Slovak Republic ought to be connected to the CSCE's communications system, the center of which is in Holland, which should permit better and faster exchange of information. According to data provided by SUKO representatives, there have been 46 inspections and control visits in Slovakia; Slovak inspectors have participated in 21 activities abroad. Apart from this, measures are being prepared in conjunction with the Open Skies Treaty. The Slovak Republic is one of 11 countries to have already ratified this treaty, which permits air observation. The treaty has also been ratified by great powers such as the United States, Canada, France, or Germany, and by two of our immediate neighbors—the Czech Republic and Hungary. However, the treaty will only enter into force after it has been ratified by 20 countries. Talks are being held at present on how to use the monitoring aircraft for the benefit of environmental protection as well. The convention on chemical weapons has not gone into force either thus far. Even though the Slovak Republic neither owns nor produces such weapons, measures are being prepared to comply with international commitments. As was pointed out by Colonel Engineer A. Mikusiak, candidate of sciences, member of the Slovak Republic's permanent mission attached to the CSCE in Vienna, all these steps are being very positively assessed by the other signatory states.

CUBA**Atomic Energy Head Calls for Ban on Nuclear Weapons**

*FL1510225793 Havana Radio Reloj Network
in Spanish 2051 GMT 15 Oct 93*

[Text] During the 37th International Conference on Atomic Energy, which recently concluded in Vienna, Austria, Cuba stated that the world needs to go beyond nonproliferation of nuclear weapons: It needs to ban them. Andres Garcia, a member of the secretariat of nuclear affairs in Cuba, said that such a stance of

working with the rest of the world for the peaceful use of nuclear energy demonstrates our country's clear position in its nuclear energy strategy.

During a meeting in this capital [not further identified], Garcia explained that, with the Revolution, Cuba has developed a great scientific potential in the area of nuclear energy. He added that Cuban technicians are now in a condition to carry out projects. Furthermore, Garcia pointed out that Cuba has been granted approximately \$1 million for nuclear projects by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

IRAQ

Russian Aircraft Reportedly Arrives To Ferry Uranium

*JN0910093693 (Clandestine) Voice of Rebellious Iraq
in Arabic 1830 GMT 8 Oct 93*

[Text] News reports have said a huge Russian-made Antonov-124 cargo plane has landed at al-Habbaniyah Airport west of Baghdad in a sensitive mission to carry 35 kg of uranium to Russia.

UN sources said that [words indistinct] remaining from nuclear fuel [words indistinct] where teams from the International Atomic Energy Agency are guarding the uranium in two sites near the [word indistinct] center south of Baghdad.

It is worth mentioning that transporting such material is very costly. It is paid for by the tyrant Saddam regime that manufactured deadly weapons in order to achieve its aggressive objectives of destroying Iraq and its material and human resources.

MAURITANIA

Nation Joins Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

*LD3009020293 Nouakchott ORTM Radio in Arabic
2300 GMT 29 Sep 93*

[Excerpt] The Council of Ministers convened today under the chairmanship of President Maouiya Ould Sid 'Ahmed Taya. The council studied and endorsed the following bills: A bill that permits the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to join the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons treaty signed on 1 July 1986 in Washington, London, and Moscow. By joining the treaty, our country expresses its commitment to peace and its eagerness to contribute to international efforts to combat the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons. [Passage omitted: other bills endorsed; President Taya briefed the the council on his visit to China; ministers of foreign affairs, interior submitted reports to the council.]

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Agreements Reached in Geneva on START Treaty Preparations

LD1610122193 Kiev UNIA in Ukrainian (1930 GMT)
16 Oct 93

[Text] Geneva, 14 October—Representatives from the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine have finished preparing seven agreements and joint statements, which condition preparations for the efficient realization of the START Treaty after it comes into force. These documents were elaborated during the sixth session of the joint coordinative and inspection commission (SUIK) [Spilna Uzhodzhuvalna ta Inspektsiyna Komisija].

Having been set up in accordance with the treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on reducing and limiting strategic offensive weapons, the SUIK bears the responsibility for resolving issues concerning the sides fulfillment of their obligations.

Debate Over Massandra Agreements Continues**AFP on Russian 'Annulment'**

LD2109143093 Paris AFP in English (405 GMT)
21 Sep 93

[Text] Moscow, Sept 21 (AFP)—Moscow annulled Tuesday the protocol of an accord on the dismantling of Ukraine's nuclear missiles after a Ukrainian newspaper published a revised text, the Foreign Ministry said.

However, the "sense of the (verbal) accord," agreed September 3 in Yalta by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Ukrainian counterpart Leonid Kravchuk was not in question, ministry spokesman Grigori Karassin added.

The accord's protocol, which was signed a few days after the verbal agreement by the two countries' prime ministers, ruled that "all" missiles on Ukrainian soil would be returned to Russia and dismantled within two years of the Ukrainian parliament ratifying the START I disarmament treaty, Karassin said.

But on September 9, the Ukrainian newspaper Kievski Vedomosti published what it claimed was the protocol text. However, the word "all" was missing and an additional phrase, stressing the accord only concerned "missiles specifically mentioned in the text" was added, Karassine said.

According to Karassin, Kravchuk's diplomatic advisor Anton Buteyko was responsible for the word changes and the Russian spokesman interpreted the changes as proof that "Ukraine intends to keep part of its nuclear arsenal, despite previous commitments."

Karassin added that despite Russian demands, "Kiev has refused to reinstate the original text and the protocol therefore no longer exists." He added that the original or "true" text would soon be published in the Russian press.

Ukrainian nationalists were against President Kravchuk apparently agreeing to allow missiles in Ukraine to be dismantled by Russia in exchange for uranium for use in nuclear plants.

In the wake of widespread criticism, Kravchuk insisted he had not formally signed anything at the September 3 meeting and within days the revised text cited by Karassin was published in the Kiev-based newspaper.

Ukraine Foreign Ministry Raises Objections

LD2409132693 Kiev UNIA in Ukrainian (120 GMT)
24 Sep 93

[Statement by Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry on Russian Federation's Decision to Denounce Massandra Protocol"—UNIA headline]

[Text] Kiev, 24 September—The Russian Foreign Ministry has made public the press report on denouncing "The Protocol on Withdrawal of All Nuclear Warheads Deployed in Ukraine to the Russian Federation," signed on 3 September of this year in the Crimea, citing the fact that corrections, made by hand, were easily noticeable in a photocopy of the document, published recently in the KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI newspaper, which allegedly changed the contents of the accord reached altogether.

In connection with the above, the press center of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry is authorized to state the following:

In violation of customary diplomatic practice, members of the Russian delegation presented the prime ministers of Ukraine and Russia with a version of the text for signing that was not the one discussed and agreed by experts of the delegations.

In as far as the text presented for signing contained points that did not meet Ukraine's national interests, the representatives of the Ukrainian side made the said changes in the presence of and with the agreement of the representatives of Russia. There were no objections, and moreover no protests, on the part of the Russian side. The document was not retyped for technical reasons.

The fact causes surprise that it is said in the press release by the Russian Foreign Ministry that the Russian side immediately annulled this protocol officially having allegedly notified representatives of Ukraine. The latter

does not correspond with reality at all. It is unclear why in that case it took the Russian side 14 days to issue a statement on denouncing the protocol and why such an influential state as Russia chose such an unusual way in diplomatic practice as a press release.

The Ukrainian side considers that the above press release lacks objectivity, distorts the actual events, and is just a clumsy attempt to discredit groundlessly one of the members of the Ukrainian delegation.

Moscow Says Pacts 'Fully Valid'

LD0110170293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1638 GMT 1 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Moscow October 1 TASS—A statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman was circulated here today to say the following:

"A Russian-Ukrainian summit on September 3 in Massandra, the Crimea, resulted in historic agreements on elimination of all nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory."

"A Russian-Ukrainian governmental agreement on utilization of nuclear warheads and major principles of utilization of nuclear warheads of strategic nuclear forces stationed in Ukraine related to the agreement were signed by the two prime ministers and published."

"The more so, the Russian and Ukrainian presidents agreed that the Ukrainian Government shall provide for withdrawal of all nuclear warheads of strategic nuclear forces stationed in Ukraine to the Russian Federation with the aim of their dismantling and destruction no later than within 24 months since the day of the Ukrainian parliament's ratification of the agreement."

"None has canceled or disavowed these agreements. This was stated by the Russian Foreign Ministry on September 21."

"At the same time, we think it necessary to again attract international attention to this fact since specific mass media bodies are spreading rumors to provoke doubts as regards the Russian-Ukrainian agreements on nuclear arms. Some of these rumors are spread on the initiative of specific Ukrainian officials."

"It seems to be done by Ukrainian forces that are dissatisfied with actions and decisions of the Ukrainian president and want to make vague the results of Massandra agreements."

"The Russian Foreign Ministry states that all Massandra agreements on nuclear arms remain fully valid. The current task is their soonest implementation. Russia is ready for it."

ПРОТОКОЛ

о выводе всех ядерных боезарядов
Стратегических ядерных сил, дислоцированных
в Украине, в Российскую Федерацию

Премьер-Министр Украины и Председатель Совета Министров
Правительства Российской Федерации договорились о том, что после
ратификации Верховным Советом Украины Договора о СНВ-1
Правительство Украины обеспечит не позднее чем в течение 24
месяцев с даты ратификации вывод ~~своих~~ ядерных боезарядов
Стратегических ядерных сил, дислоцированных в Украине, в
Российскую Федерацию, с целью их разуконплектования и
уничтожения.

ЗА ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВО
УКРАИНЫ



ЗА ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВО
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ



1 сентября 1993 года

Russo-Ukrainian Nuclear Warhead Protocol (Kiev UKRAINA MOLODA in Ukrainian 10 Sep 93 p 1)

[Photocopy of document headed "PROTOCOL on Withdrawal to Russia of All Nuclear Warheads of the Strategic Nuclear Forces Deployed in Ukraine." Identical photocopy was published in Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian 10 Sep 93 p 1 and in Kiev KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 9 Sep 93 (page unknown)]

Russia Denies Revising Agreement

LD1110221893 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2035 GMT
11 Oct 93

[Text] Kiev—On 11 October, the press secretary of the Russian Federation's Embassy to Ukraine confirmed in a conversation with UNIAN correspondents that Russia's position on the Massandra agreements has not changed, contrary to reports by some news agencies, on Russia's official circles having allegedly revised their attitude toward buying part of the Black Sea Fleet. Recently, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on the Massandra agreements, which in particular confirms as follows:

"The task is now to continue and implement the agreements as soon as possible. Russia is ready for that." In accordance with the same statement, a bilateral agreement was signed between Russia and Ukraine recently on the guarantee period and manufacturer's [avtorskiy] supervision of the operation of the strategic forces' strategic missile systems. It is in connection with this

that Russia insists on the soonest possible withdrawal of nuclear charges, the guarantee period of which has expired.

Ukraine, Russia Hold Talks 14 October

Protocol on 'Intentions' Signed

LD1510104993 Kiev UNIA in Ukrainian 0918 GMT
15 Oct 93

[Text] At Ukrainian-Russian talks between experts Kiev, 14 October: The press service of the Ukraine Defense Ministry has reported: "The possibility of technical assistance being rendered to the Russian side on the part of Ukraine in servicing their missile complexes was examined in the course of the latest meeting of experts from Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Issues of further work on guarantee supervision [harantiynny nahlyad] of strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine were discussed." A protocol of intentions guaranteeing the safe operation and maintenance of nuclear weapons was signed in accordance with the outcome of the meeting.

In the course of the talks the sides exchanged opinions regarding the safe withdrawal of Ukrainian and Russian missile complexes from combat duty, while at the same time rendering the necessary mutual assistance. The sides expressed satisfaction that the positions of both groups of experts were well considered and based on the understanding of mutual problems and ways of resolving them.

The group of experts from Ukraine was headed by Lieutenant-General Kryzhko, head of the center of administrative management of strategic nuclear forces of the Ukraine Defense Ministry, and from the Russian Federation Lieutenant-General Nikitin, deputy commander in chief of the missile forces of strategic designation of Russia.

Talks on Arms Maintenance

LD1410210793 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 14 Oct 93

[Text] Ukrainian and Russian experts have held a regular meeting, during which they considered the possibility of rendering technical assistance on the part of Ukraine to the Russian side in servicing their missile complexes and further work on guaranteeing supervision and technical maintenance of the strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine. This has been reported by the press service of the Defense Ministry. In particular, a protocol of intent has been signed, as far as the guarantee of safe operation and maintenance of nuclear weapons in Ukraine is concerned.

Kiev Press Report

AU2010162893 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 19 Oct 93 p 3

[Report by the Press Service of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense and UKRINFORM: "Ukrainian and Russian Experts Have Found a Common Language"]

[Text] The scheduled meeting in Kiev between experts of Ukraine and the Russian Federation has ended in signing a protocol on intentions regarding guaranteeing safe exploitation and storage of nuclear weapons. A possibility of rendering technical assistance to the Russian side in servicing its missile complexes was analyzed and the question of further work on guaranteed supervision and technical maintenance of strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine was discussed.

The sides exchanged opinions on the safe removal from combat duty of Ukrainian and Russian missile complexes, provision of corresponding mutual assistance, and exchange of existing methods for guaranteeing nuclear and ecological safety. The experts also discussed a number of other problems that present interest to both states.

The participants in the meeting expressed their satisfaction with the fulfilled work, because, this time, the positions of the groups of experts were balanced and were based upon mutual understanding and joint approach to resolving problems.

UN Study Shows CIS Republics Dumping Nuclear Waste

AU1510154093 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 14 Oct 93 p 1

[Hannes Gamillschegg report: "USSR Successor States Simply Dump Nuclear Waste Into Nature"]

[Text] Copenhagen, 13 October—The inadequate security standards of nuclear power plants is not the only threat to the successor states of the Soviet Union and its neighbors. They are also threatened by radioactive contamination as a result of the shockingly thoughtless way of dealing with nuclear waste. For cost reasons, material that was exposed to radiation is not disposed of any more, but is simply dumped into nature. This is shown in a UN Development Program (UNDP) study, the results of which have now been presented by Director Reinhardt Helmke in Copenhagen.

Helmke criticized the fact that the quantity of nuclear waste that was delivered to the responsible disposal facilities is drastically decreasing. "In most countries, the alarming decline is so striking that it cannot be explained by a production decrease." For instance, Ukrainian nuclear physicist Nikolay Steynberg told the UNDP that in the last one-and-a-half years, no liquid nuclear waste had been disposed of in his country. It was cheaper to dump the waste into the rivers.

In Latvia, the quantity of radioactive waste delivered by hospitals and industry had decreased to 25 percent, said Helmke. The rest presumably ended up in nature where radioactivity was slowly seeping away into the ground water. Factories in Siberia were dumping large quantities of radioactive waste into the rivers and the Caspian Sea, where recent measurements showed a "hugely increased radioactivity," said Helmke. The UNDP director warned that radioactive substances were also dumped into the Barents Sea and Kara Sea in the North and presumably also into the Baltic Sea. He added: "The information that we have does not include military facilities that continue to be shrouded in secrecy."

The study also points out the widespread use of radioactive materials in sectors in which the West does not use nuclear power. In agriculture, research facilities, and factories, small nuclear reactors ensure the electricity supply. Even the lighthouses along the Baltic coasts are operated with nuclear power. In Moldova, there are 11,000 small nuclear power plants, in Ukraine 100,000. In addition, highly radioactive materials are used in industrial facilities, hospitals, and medical research to a much larger extent than in the West. Control is inadequate. In Lithuania, a container with highly radioactive beryllium isotopes was found by accident in the basement of a bank recently. It had been deposited there absolutely unprotected as collateral against a loan.

In the Lithuanian nuclear power plant at Ignalina, the two nuclear waste disposal facilities are full, it says in the report. No one knows what should be done with the 80 fuel rods that the plant produces every year, and with the other nuclear waste. A total of 80 percent of Lithuania's electricity is supplied by Ignalina. In Murmansk, nuclear submarines rot away with their reactors on board. In Armenia, the authorities have closed down the only nuclear power plant because it is located in a seismic area. But the radioactive material was not removed from the plant. After months without electricity, with a disastrous shortage of fuel, and without a single functioning hospital, one is now examining the question whether it could be put into operation again, said Reinhardt Helmke: "Nobody knows how people are to survive the winter."

The UNDP's answer to these gigantic problems are a modest \$50 million, with which the setting up of control bodies—of the 15 CIS republics, only Russia and Ukraine have nuclear protection authorities—the training of experts, and training programs for those working with dangerous substances are to be financed. In many cases, however, concern about the dangers is greater than the will to do something about them, said Helmke, who added that there are still no firm pledges from UN member states for the \$50 million.

RUSSIA

Defense Ministry Aide on Dismantling Ukraine Nuclear Arms

PM1910091393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Oct 93 First Edition p 4

[Article by Major General Vitaliy Yakovlev of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense: "Russia Is Ready To Clear Ukraine's Nuclear Obstacles. But Ukraine Considers Them Its Own"]

[Text] It might have been possible not to mention the incident in a nuclear munitions store in one of Ukraine's nuclear technical units, since a competent group of Russian specialists headed by chief designers and developers of nuclear munitions has already made a corresponding conclusion, and proposals have been submitted to the prime ministers of Ukraine and Russia for nuclear munitions—above all, those whose periods of serviceability are expiring and also those whose times for operational checks are overdue—to be moved without delay to Russian industrial enterprises for dismantling. But the reaction of the leadership of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to what happened is surprising.

The UNIAN news agency prepared specially for IZVESTIYA an interview with General I. Bizhan, Ukrainian deputy minister of defense, in which he considers last year's Russian General Staff directive on the dismantlement of the "S" installations on Ukrainian territory to be the chief cause that resulted in the store being overfilled with nuclear munitions. This really is a case of "the pot calling the kettle black...."

In May 1992 the Ukrainian president set out on a visit to Washington, and a letter to the U.S. President stated that... "Ukraine will have nonnuclear status, will adhere in the future to three nonnuclear principles...." Again in May Ukraine signed the Lisbon protocol, in which it pledged to subscribe to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as soon as possible as a state which does not have them.

But in that same month the nuclear technical units, which handle approximately 600 strategic aircraft nuclear munitions, were sworn to the Ukrainian oath, which just a little earlier had also been taken by a unit of strategic bombers' flight personnel. Ukraine acquired for the first time the possibility in principle of using aircraft nuclear weapons.

It was then that the Russian Federation Defense Ministry drew attention to the incompatibility of the pledges adopted by Ukraine and the directly opposite actions of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry and proposed moving nuclear munitions to the "S" installations, which then were still Russian and were designed to store nuclear munitions and to exercise control over their maintenance in Ukraine.

In June and July of last year Ukraine removed the nuclear warheads of strategic missiles from alert duty and stockpiled them. In so doing, just as at Pervomaysk, the norms for storing nuclear munitions were violated. The Russian Defense Ministry again proposed moving them to the "S" installations or sending them to Russia for subsequent elimination under Ukraine's control. Again there was no reply.

At the beginning of 1993 Ukraine set up the Center of Administrative Control of Troops of Strategic Nuclear Forces and attempted to transfer the Russian "S" installations to the jurisdiction of this center. It was after this that the Russian Defense Ministry decided to disband the "S" installations before the end of 1993.

Finally, in June the Agreement on the Status of the "S" Installations was initialed at the level of the leaders of Russian and Ukrainian military delegations. A few days later, however, this too was reduced to naught when on 2 July the Ukrainian parliament enshrined in legislation the right to own nuclear weapons. As early as 3 July (with enviable haste) the Ukrainian minister of defense transferred jurisdiction over the "S" installations, and they became Ukrainian.

The chief designers and developers of nuclear munitions cannot now answer for the safe handling of nuclear munitions on the territory of another state without having permanent control over their maintenance.

The only radical solution to the problem is the implementation as soon as possible (as planned) of the agreement "On Salvaging Nuclear Charges" reached 3 September in the Crimea between the Russian Federation Government and the Ukrainian Government.

We must wait no longer. The Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy is ready to dismantle all of Ukraine's nuclear "obstacles" in the space of 18-20 months. In our view, Ukrainian parliamentarians must understand that nuclear weapons cannot be the hostage of political ambitions.

Strategic Rocket Forces General Comments on START I

LD1210103593 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0920 GMT 12 Oct 93

[From the "Radio Slavyanka" broadcast of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] The offensive weapons reduction treaty, START-I, will be implemented. This was said by Lieutenant General [Gen] Viktor Yesin, head of the operational directorate of the Main Staff of Strategic Rocket Forces. Although Ukraine has not yet signed the treaty, the Russian side has in effect started to implement it. According to Gen. Yesin, the missile complexes are systematically being taken off alert status as their service life expires. This work is conducted in accordance with

nuclear, technological, and ecological safety regulations. The American side is doing the same.

Russia-Germany Talks

LD2409192893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1543 GMT 24 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Kulbitskiy]

[Text] Bonn September 24 TASS—A regular round of Russo-German consultations on arms control and disarmament was held here on Friday.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov and German officer Josef Holik authorized by the German Government took part in it.

According to the press service of the German Foreign Ministry, the participants focussed on the issues relating to the process of nuclear disarmament and mutual cooperation with an eye to eliminating weapons of mass destruction.

In 1993, Germany allotted 10 mln dm [German marks] from its state budget to help Russia eliminate weapons of mass destruction.

Conversion of Weapons Grade Plutonium Suggested

MK2509133793 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 57, 25 Sep 93 (signed to press 24 Sep) p 3

[Unattributed report: "A Concept for the Conversion of Weapons Grade Plutonium"]

[Text] Viktor Murogov, head of the Physical Engineering Institute (a structure under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation Ministry of Nuclear Energy), has reported that the Russian Federation Nuclear Energy Ministry has approved a concept for converting weapons grade plutonium, large stockpiles of which have accumulated in Russia because it is impossible to reutilize them or to preserve them for a long time with subsequent use as a nuclear fuel. Within the framework of the proposed conversion program, Viktor Murogov said that the "Mayak" production association has launched the construction of three fast neutron reactors. One reactor will use approximately 2.5 tonnes of plutonium per year. Utilized plutonium stocks are expected to be used as a source of energy for 30 years.

Program for Recycling Armaments, Hardware Detailed

PM2510124793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 22 Oct 93 p 3

[Unattributed report under "Draft Plans" rubric: "Recycling Armaments"]

[Text] On the instructions of the government the Russian Committee for the Defense Industry has started

elaborating a draft Federal Targeted Program for the Industrial Recycling of Armaments and Military Equipment for the Period Through the Year 2000. This involves armaments and military equipment which have become obsolete or are due to be scrapped under international disarmament agreements.

The most varied weapons, ranging from strategic missile systems to munitions, come under the program. The size of the program can be judged from the quantities scheduled to be recycled:

	Units
Ground-launched and sea-launched ICBM's	Up to 2,000
Nuclear-powered submarines	178
Diesel-electric submarines	31
Surface ships	725
Aircraft and helicopters	Over 3,500
Tanks and armored fighting vehicles	29,500
Missile systems and guided weapons of the Air Defense Forces	Over 20,000

Moreover, hundreds of thousands of tonnes of munitions and 1 trillion rubles' [R] worth of communications gear and armament electronic equipment, including scrap precious metals, will be recycled.

It is anticipated that the total value of the metals which can be extracted from the resmelted armaments and military hardware will be more than R2 trillion rubles [R] (in prices as of the middle of the current year), which includes:

	Billion rubles
Ferrous metals	400
Nonferrous metals	300
Precious metals	1,000

Moreover, around R2 trillion could additionally be obtained from the sale of units [agregat], assemblies [uzel], and components [detal].

According to expert estimates, the economic effectiveness of the program is guaranteed.

The program is designed for phased implementation. In the first and second phases (1993-1995) available technologies and existing and newly organized production capacities will basically be used.

Detailed feasibility studies of all aspects of industrial recycling for the main types of armaments and military hardware (strategic and other missiles of various designations; aviation, naval, and ground combat equipment; munitions; electronic equipment) have been presented in six specific targeted programs.

Scientific design establishments, defense sector enterprises—above all those which have been converted—and commercial structures which have obtained licenses to carry out recycling work and produce civilian goods, including consumer goods, are being involved in the implementation of the program. The participation of legal entities of various forms of ownership in work to implement the program is determined on a competitive basis by independent expert opinion, with the licensing of various kinds of activity.

CBW Destruction Process Surveyed

PM2510132193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 Oct 93 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Anatoliy Demyanovich Kuntsevich, head of the Russian President's Committee for Problems of the Convention on Chemical and Biological Weapons, by Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Dolgikh under the "Today's Interlocutor" rubric; place and date not given: "Chemical Weapons: Are They Easy To Eliminate?"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text]

Calling Card: Anatoliy Demyanovich Kuntsevich

He was born at Mogilev Oblast's settlement of Svisloch in 1934, and joined the Armed Forces in 1952. He spent 25 years at the Shikhany Military-Chemical Center, 10 of them as the center's head. He was discharged into the reserve in 1991 with the rank of lieutenant general from the post of deputy chief of the Chemical Troops. Since 1980 he has been a corresponding member, and subsequently a full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences (now the Russian Academy of Sciences). In 1986-1989 he participated in the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station] accident, and also took part in eliminating [the consequences of] accidents at Donbass mines and other facilities. He was posted to "hot spots" in Cuba, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. He is a Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of the Lenin Prize and the international "Golden She-Wolf" prize, and adviser to the UN Secretary General on chemical weapons matters. Since February 1992 he has headed the Russian President's Committee for Problems of the Convention on Chemical and Biological Weapons. He is married with two children.

Dolgikh: Anatoliy Demyanovich, public attention has recently focused on the committee you head and on you personally, mainly due to the Convention on Banning the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, which was signed in Paris in January this year. It is well known that specialists from your committee also took part in preparing this truly historic document....

Kuntsevich: First of all, let us make it absolutely clear that the history of the struggle to ban chemical weapons spans more than 100 years. But this process was given a powerful boost in the last 10-15 years, when objectively

ripe conditions emerged for realizing that not only the use but even the storage of weapons of mass destruction, which are "surplus to requirements" and are already degrading, are fraught with a serious danger for people and their habitat.

The former USSR created a stockpile of about 40,000 tonnes of diverse combat toxic substances. Aviation bombs, missile warheads, artillery shells, and special containers were all charged with them. All these stockpiles are now stored at seven different sites in Russia, and the Ministry of Defense is in charge of them.

The Wyoming Memorandum between the Soviet Union (now Russia) and the United States was elaborated in 1989, under which there was an exchange of general information on military-chemical and industrial facilities. Preparation for its second stage is now under way. The sides will exchange more precise data on chemical weapons, the location of facilities, the conditions for storage of toxic substances, and the plans for their destruction. Reciprocal inspections will then take place.

But the main document which determines the procedure and schedule for mankind's deliverance from chemical weapons is the aforementioned convention, which to date has been signed by representatives of 140 states, including Russia. Immediately following the signing, the participating states embarked on the creation of an infrastructure to provide backup for implementing its provisions and for coordinating and monitoring the process of destroying chemical weapons at both international and national level. An internationally-financed preparatory commission of the Organization for Banning Chemical Weapons is at present working on a permanent basis in The Hague (Netherlands). For their part, all states which are parties to the convention are setting up national organs (committees) for implementing the convention's provisions.

Our committee was formed in February 1992 by edict of the Russian Federation president to develop measures enabling Russia to honor its commitments in the sphere of chemical and biological weapons. It is an interdepartmental coordinating organ whose purpose is not only to bring together all the strands of this problem but also to become a kind of center monitoring the activity of ministries and departments participating in the elimination process. We have also been tasked, in compliance with the committee's statute, to also engage in international monitoring of chemical and biological weapons.

Dolgikh: Even so, your top problem must of course be the elimination of Russian arsenals. What is the situation with the draft program for the destruction of chemical weapons?

Kuntsevich: Under the Paris Convention, Russia should embark on the actual destruction of its chemical arsenal not later than two years following the treaty's ratification, in other words by 1997. But it can be asserted right now that this will become possible only in conditions of

coordinated collaboration between the relevant ministries and departments, complete mutual understanding with local administrations and the population of regions where it is planned to site the facilities for destruction of chemical weapons, and—finally—allocation of the appropriate funds. The comprehensive program has yet to be finally adopted. Further work is being done on its draft. The most likely outcome will be that stockpiles of chemical weapons will be eliminated at the sites where they are stored. I would also like to note that on 9 August this year Russia's President Boris Yeltsin signed a special directive providing for the creation of a government commission to select regions for the siting of facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons on Russia's territory. This commission will start work in the very near future. Subsequently the program will be submitted without fail for approval by the public and for expert study by state ecological organs. Once it is adopted, its practical implementation will become the most important stage. This will require considerable material expenditures by our country, namely a sum to the order of 500 billion rubles at today's prices.

Dolgikh: Anatoliy Demyanovich, you have mentioned a truly astronomical sum which, bearing in mind the country's calamitous economic state, is downright ruinous.

Kuntsevich: Alas, this is exactly the amount that is needed to ensure that Russia honors its international commitments. We are not asking for a single kopek more than we need. Furthermore, we do have certain ideas which could seriously ease this financial burden. They are associated, for example, with the idea of processing the reaction compounds which would be produced as a result of the neutralization of toxic substances and would be valuable for the national economy.

Dolgikh: I have heard it said that particularly pure arsenic, which is needed by the radio electronic industry, can be extracted from lewisite. Could something else be extracted from other toxic substances? And if so, why are the American incinerating everything, seeing that they are better than us at looking after money?

Kuntsevich: This is actually an instance where our scientists have gotten the better of their transatlantic colleagues. Way back in the sixties we learned to transform combat toxic substances into different resins for timber processing, special fluids for the fast pumping of oil from wells, and other useful substances. All this is now being rationalized, as it were—systematized, registered, and patented. If we succeed in implementing it, we will be able to recoup part of the expenditure envisaged for the destruction of chemical weapons.

We also believe that different commercial structures could also take part in financing the program. They will join in—it is a profitable business, but the appropriate conditions and at least some kind of preferential treatment should be established for them.

Dolgikh: All these are our own problems, so to say. But the West is also interested in the earliest possible destruction of such terrible weapons, especially in a country that is as unstable as ours. Maybe, for the sake of achieving this, they should loosen their purse strings?

Kuntsevich: The Americans have already allocated \$25 million, and talks are under way on the provision of additional funds to expand projects directly associated with the destruction of chemical weapons. While considering alternative technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons, we are working on the question of having the U.S. side set up in Russia two technological facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons on a turnkey basis within the framework of the agreement on aid for the Russian Federation. The elaboration of a Russian-German agreement is at its final stages, whereby a series of German firms [(Luvb) (name as transliterated), Keller GmbH] will participate in solving the problems of the city of Kambarka and the settlement of Gornyy. We are also in contact with a series of U.S. firms—Parsons, General Atomics, Westinghouse, Battel, and others which are offering modern technologies for implementation in our country. This question will be studied jointly by Russian and U.S. specialists, and it is also proposed to develop joint projects with firms from Sweden, Italy, and other countries. Our ultimate goal is to ease the burden on the country's budget by at least 30-40 percent.

Dolgikh: Nonetheless, are we actually doing something at present as regards the elimination of toxic substances?

Kuntsevich: Yes, of course. Preparations for the large-scale destruction of chemical weapons in the former USSR got under way back in the early eighties. At that time we began building an experimental facility in Chayevsk, which was designed to work out the best possible technologies. It was also planned that later on it could have become a permanent [statsionarnyy] plant for the destruction of toxic substances with an annual capacity of up to 350 tonnes. A thorough expert study was conducted with international participation, which confirmed the complete safety of the technologies. Nevertheless, due to a series of objective and subjective reasons which will be further discussed at the proper time, the facility was not commissioned and the ensuing results are well known: The plant is standing idle, running colossal losses—100 million rubles in preperestroika prices have gone to waste.

Dolgikh: It is well known that considerable quantities of chemical weapons were "buried" at sea in the past, and their present condition is worrying many people today. Who is dealing with this problem in our country?

Kuntsevich: In compliance with a government decision, a series of departments, including our committee, are now working on a targeted federal program to eliminate the industrial base for the production of chemical weapons in Russia. Specifically, it will include an appraisal of the impact of earlier burial (submersion) of chemical

weapons on people's health and the ecology. Alas, at present not a single department has complete information on where they were either submerged or buried. Therefore, much work still has to be done in archives to sum up, study, and analyze all data.

Dolgikh: And what is the situation regarding biological weapons? Is this also a prerogative of the committee which you head?

Kuntsevich: On 11 April last year Boris Yeltsin signed an edict banning biological weapons in Russia. The issue is thus finally closed. We have absolutely no stockpiles of biological weapons, therefore—fortunately—there are no problems regarding their destruction. Now we are formulating programs to retool the relevant scientific centers, former participants in military-biological programs, for general scientific activity to supply our population with effective medicines.

Dolgikh: One last question. 'Is it not a paradox that someone who has spent his entire life on the development of chemical weapons has now become their main eliminator?

Kuntsevich: It is all very simple to explain. When you need to defuse a mine you call in a sapper, when you need to destroy or convert [pererabotat] a nuclear weapon you assign the task to the relevant experts. Could nonspecialists possibly tackle chemical disarmament? I am certain that they could not. The destruction of chemical weapons requires the involvement of only top-grade professionals. There are, alas, only a few of them left but, while they are alive, their knowledge must be utilized. We will thus ensure the safety of the present and future generations of our compatriots.

As far as I personally am concerned, my main specialized field is not the development of weapons but, on the contrary, their destruction. Even while I was only a young scientist I succeeded in developing new and effective methods for the degasification (neutralization, destruction) of toxic substances and in creating about two dozen different degasification procedures and technological means whose specifications were truly superior to their counterparts abroad.

The work I did for my degree as candidate and later on as doctor of sciences was devoted to theoretical and practical problems in the sphere of homogeneous heterogeneous [as published] processes of the destruction of toxic substances' molecules in different environments and subjacent surfaces, including real facilities (equipment, weapons, machinery, sites, buildings, and installations). I succeeded in forming and heading a major scientific and practical school which achieved significant results in the sphere of theoretical and applied problems concerning the reactivity of organophosphorus substances. Therefore, the destruction of chemical weapons is my professional work.

As regards their creation, while I was the leader of a major collective I was naturally directly involved in this

work within the framework of ensuring parity and national security. I was then offered the job as consultant to the UN Secretary General on chemical weapons problems and to become actively involved in the process of international talks and directly in the preparation of the convention's text. I am certain that mankind can and must live in safety in the 21st century on the basis of multilateral efforts on the basis of parity.

West European Nations Help Dismantle Russian Weapons

Accord Signed in Paris

LD2110075693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2153 GMT 20 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Andrey Krasnoshchekov, Yuriy Lopatin, Viktor Khrekov, and Igor Shchegolev]

[Text] Paris, 21 Oct—The talks between Russian and French Foreign Ministers Andrey Kozyrev and Alain Juppe ended here on Wednesday evening with the signing of Russian-French agreements on cooperation in dismantling nuclear weapons in Russia, and on cooperation to ensure the reliability and safety of the transportation of nuclear weapons in Russia. The heads of the two countries' foreign policy departments discussed a broad range of international problems and preparations for the visit to Russia by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur at the beginning of November.

In a meeting with journalists prior to the signing ceremony, A. Kozyrev noted that the documents are a development of accords reached earlier, and provide "some financial and technical assistance for Russia in the destruction of its nuclear armaments." It is a matter in particular of the French side providing several dismantlement machine tools and of storage facilities and means to transport the relevant materials. The minister stressed that it will be a "very specific contribution toward eliminating the nuclear threat that has hung over the world for the last 50 years."

In his turn A. Juppe recalled that France has already made a decision to allocate Russia 400 million francs in the next few years to assist in the implementation of nuclear weapon dismantling programs. Under the present agreements, the French minister specified, Russia will be provided with the first part of this aid amounting to 160 million francs.

Warhead Dismantling Equipment To Be Supplied

AU2110141893 Paris AFP in English 1347 GMT 21 Oct 93

[Text] Paris, Oct 21 (AFP)—France will shortly supply machine tools and containers for dismantling Russia's nuclear warheads and converting fissile materials extracted from them to civilian use, French officials said Thursday.

Under two accords worth 160 million francs (28 million dollars) signed with visiting Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on Wednesday, machine tools will be supplied to cut up warheads and containers will be provided for the safe transport of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium taken from the warheads.

Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), Russia and other nuclear states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) must cut their warheads from between 20,000 and 25,000 to 3,500 - representing between 500 and 1,000 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium and 100 to 200 tons of plutonium, the officials said.

The United States, Britain and to a lesser extent Germany are also helping to destroy CIS nuclear warheads.

A main Franco-Russian agreement worth 400 million francs (70 million dollars) overall was signed in Moscow in November 1992 and resulted from an official visit to Paris by President Boris Yeltsin at the beginning of the year.

Under that accord, France has already supplied radiation security equipment for dismantling the warheads and for stocking fissile materials and is providing know-how for converting them to civilian use, officials said.

They said France acquired the technology from taking its own nuclear warheads apart to check on their condition. Paris also dismantled its airborne final warning AN 52 nuclear bomb in 1991 and its ground-to-ground Pluton missiles in 1992.

The country's Atomic Energy Commissariat has studied methods of re-using the fissile materials in its nuclear power stations in the form of a fuel mixture of uranium and plutonium known as Mox.

On Thursday Kozyrev met with French Defence Minister Francois Leotard and the two discussed European security problems, notably in the Caucasus, and developments with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Defence Ministry officials said.

The ministers also discussed the continuing French moratorium on nuclear testing, the officials said.

Kozyrev met President Francois Mitterrand on Wednesday. Prime Minister Edouard Balladur is expected to visit Moscow some time in November.

German Aid for Destruction of Chemical Weapons

LD2210174093 Hamburg DPA in German 1633 GMT 22 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow/Bonn (DPA)—Germany will give Russia financial support with the destruction of chemical weapons. The Bonn Foreign Ministry reports that an agreement to this effect was signed today in Moscow. It will be implemented in cooperation between German

firms and Russian bodies on concrete individual projects, which will receive grants from the German Government.

Cooperation is under way on a pilot plant for the destruction of chemical warfare agents that are harmful to the skin, and on the safe, environmental handling of chemical warfare agents due for destruction, among other things.

In 1993, Bonn is providing around 5 million German marks for the agreed projects.

'Nuclear Button' Was in Yeltsin's Hands During Crisis

PM0810195393 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Oct 93 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General Viktor Yesin, chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Main Staff Operational Directorate, by Aleksandr Dolinin; place, date not given: "'Nuclear Button' Remained Under President's Control"]

[Text] **Dolinin:** Viktor Ivanovich, in whose hands was the "nuclear button" at this critical moment for Russia?

Yesin: It was, as it was supposed to be, in Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin's hands.

Dolinin: The rocket forces mount alert duties at various levels of combat readiness. At what level was it during those days in October?

Yesin: At the routine level. The alert duty was carried out in a state of constant combat readiness. There were no instructions from the supreme commander in chief or the defense minister to alter the level of readiness. We act in strict accordance with their orders.

Colonel General I.D. Sergeyev, commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, basing his judgment on the situation which was developing, made a well-founded decision to enhance vigilance, strengthen security, and, if necessary, the defense of facilities.

Dolinin: But what were the rocket forces doing during these days?

Yesin: They were undergoing routine combat training. Of course, within the limits dictated by the situation. These applied mostly in the Moscow zone but also in other regions. For example, reasonable restrictions were imposed on troops leaving the places where they are permanently stationed.

Dolinin: Were the plans for the troops' combat training disrupted? After all, as far as I know, end-of-training-period performance evaluations had to be postponed...

Yesin: No, they were not disrupted. We only had to make adjustments to the plans for combat training and troops'

leave in accordance with the prevailing situation. Commanders at local level, outside the Moscow zone, carried out evaluations but within the certain restrictions I have already mentioned.

Dolinin: Nonetheless, there are, obviously, problems which prevent the Strategic Rockets Forces' normal operations?

Yesin: They are well-known and a feature of all branches of the Armed Forces. For example, insufficient finances. We are not asking for anything extra, but that amount which it was planned we should receive in 1993 is necessary. True, matters have gotten somewhat better during the past month. The government paid back several "debts," but this is not enough.

For this reason, we are unable in a number of places to prepare facilities adequately for the winter. Manpower acquisition is yet another problem. On the whole, the manpower acquisition for rocket forces units as regards sergeants and soldiers is at the same level as the other service branches. Hence the increased workload for personnel, especially officers, when carrying out not just their own duties but also those of "absent" servicemen.

Dolinin: What might be the fate of treaties on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons?

Yesin: We assume that the START I Treaty will be implemented. Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have ratified it. Ukraine has not as yet signed. At the same time we cannot maintain on alert duty those missile complexes whose life span has ended. We are taking them off alert duty according to plan, as are the Americans, in anticipation of the treaties coming into force. We are carrying out this work at the minimum necessary level, and are taking pains over nuclear, technological, and ecological safety.

Dolinin: One last thing, Viktor Ivanovich. KRSNAYA ZVEZDA published materials on the problems of nuclear safety in the Pervomayskaya Division in Ukraine. How serious is the situation there?

Yesin: It remains unchanged and may only change for the better if the accords on nuclear missiles reached by the Russian and Ukrainian presidents in Yalta are implemented in practical terms. We are in control of the situation in rocket units in Ukraine within the framework of the grouping's operational control. Administrative control, as we know, is in the hands of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Government Aiming To Scrap, Sell Pacific Fleet Warships

LD1410165493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0427 GMT 14 Oct 93

[Text] The Government has recently adopted a decision which aims to protect Russia's state interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the decision, the Defense Ministry is given a month to draw up a program for

scrapping written-off Pacific fleet warships and for their sale to overseas buyers. The proceeds will be spent on improving the welfare of servicemen in the region.

Spent Nuclear Fuel to Arctic Islands Considered

LD2809042593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1801 GMT 27 Sep 93

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Lev Rummyantsev]

[Text] Sosnovyy Bor (Leningrad Oblast). 27 Sep—Russia's nuclear power stations need a single, reliable, and relatively inexpensive engineered storage of nuclear waste, stated director of Leningradskaya AES [nuclear electric power station] Anatoliy Yerepin to an ITAR-TASS correspondent. He believes that a specialized state organization must collect and store high activity wastes. Our researchers are developing measures to ensure safe removal of spent nuclear fuel by vessels across northern seas or up the Belomorkanal, [the canal linking the Baltic and the White Seas] to Arctic Sea islands where they can be safely stored. These ideas will be submitted to the government.

During the twenty years of operation the Leningradskaya AES has accumulated about 45,000 cubic meters of spent fuel, kept in storage not far from the station at Leningradspetscombinat specialized enterprise, a former top-secret facility. The waste of all the 250 nuclear enterprises and research centers of St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast is kept there in containers. Having a major engineered storage in such a densely populated area is most unwelcome.

Foreign Ministry Supports Nuclear Materials Ban

LD3009204693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2022 GMT 30 Sep 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Excerpt] Moscow September 30 TASS—The speech by U.S. President Bill Clinton at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly on September 27 provoked great interest in Russia. "We highly appreciate the U.S. support to the course of our reforms," the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a commentary released on Thursday. [passage omitted]

Moscow understands quite well the importance of initiatives moved by Clinton with an aim to tighten the regime of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation, which is a top priority of Russia's foreign policy as well, the document went on to say.

We also favour the U.S. intention to press for the signing of an international agreement imposing a ban on the production of splitting materials for weapons, which is in full agreement with earlier proposals by the Russian president. "We come out for establishing by the year

2000 a controllable and transparent international regime prohibiting these materials," the Foreign Ministry commentary noted.

"We hail the U.S. intention to work for transforming the existing regimes of export control, including missile technology control, into universal mechanisms to prevent proliferation of armaments and dangerous technologies. These measures should be matched with ensuring equal interests of all states in the sphere of international scientific and technical cooperation, as well as with lifting restrictions inherent from the Cold War stand-off on Russia's entering world markets of high technologies," the commentary stressed.

We would like the Russian and U.S. initiatives for imposing a moratorium on nuclear explosions to result in a full ban on nuclear tests.

We clearly see the need to step up international efforts aiming to regulate regional conflicts, to increase the effectiveness of UN moves to prepare and implement peace-keeping missions. It is Russia that largely bears peace-making burden in settling crises in the former Soviet Union, therefore it hopes the international community will provide an actual support to these efforts, the Foreign Ministry statement said in conclusion.

'Viewpoint' Column Argues Case for Selling Arms to West

PM1510135193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Aug 93 First Edition p 7

["Viewpoint" article by economist Sergey Paliy: "Saving Russia's 'Weapons Foundry' Will Help Preserve Stability in Europe"—last paragraph is editorial note]

[Text] Europe, where until recently the United States and the USSR ensured the equilibrium of forces, is gradually growing accustomed to a new way of life. The breakup of the USSR left it face to face with the United States. However, the transatlantic state, still powerful but showing signs of decrepitude, can no longer act as the patron of the Old World. Primarily because the reunited Germany is quite successfully becoming the most powerful political factor on the European Continent.

Like a gigantic wave, the FRG is now beginning to pull the other states of Europe into its orbit. Like a drug, the strong German mark exercises a pull on entrepreneurs from all over Europe. It seems to have been a kind of passkey to the East. It is no accident that Germany's growing role in the economies of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is already clearly visible. Moreover, Budapest—a former member of the Warsaw Pact—has concluded an unprecedented agreement with Bonn to modernize its Armed Forces. The new independent Baltic republics are also voicing hopes of attracting German capital.

It is quite possible that Germany's vigorous continental policy may in time slip into revanchism. Needless to say

there are no signs to indicate that it intends preparing for a "hot" war in the future. But, bearing the lessons of history in mind, no one can rule out such a turn of events. And in the event of a turn for the worse, a possible solution would be for all European states at once to collectively check German expansionism. It is not of course a question of an immediate economic boycott, but of developing multilateral ties that consider other countries' interests. An option must be found that would not offend the FRG and would reflect the defensive interests of the countries of Europe without violating U.S. interests in Europe. I am sure that Russia too must now organize regional cooperation with certain European countries.

Nor, given present-day realities, can there be any question of forming new military blocs. The Mediterranean states' defense initiatives, for instance, can be coordinated via their economic integration. With a "common" military economy these states could make substantial savings on military spending and systematically reduce production of what are ineffective categories of arms—compared with other countries' output—buying more modern equipment from their regional partners.

If this question is raised for discussion, the European states may now conclude that it is far more beneficial to have Russia as an economic partner than as a political adversary.

The Russian military-industrial complex does indeed have vast capacities. However, its export potential is only 10-percent utilized. MiG and Su combat aircraft with European electronic systems could provide real competition for U.S. products, as could T-80U tanks, Piranha submarines, IFV-3 infantry fighting vehicles, and Thor-M1 surface-to-air missile systems.

It is extremely important that Russia could supply the whole range of its state-of-the-art arms to pay off its loans. Turkey, with numerically the largest armed forces of any European NATO country, has already taken advantage of this situation. Ankara has already bought military hardware from Russia—20 helicopters, 25 armored personnel carriers, and small arms—paying just \$15 million in all. Turkey has also shown great interest in producing certain categories of Russian weapons at home under license. Other NATO countries might also be interested in that kind of cooperation.

Economically this kind of cooperation is also profitable for Russia. In the opinion of Western experts, at least \$15 billion will be needed for conversion. However, we can find the money to switch the military-industrial complex to nonmilitary production just by increasing exports of combat hardware since revenue from arms sales in 1992 totaled \$1.9 billion. We do not have enough other sources of hard currency to even pay the interest on the loans. Incidentally, we could supply technical services as well as military equipment "as a package."

Military servicing would provide one-fourth of the revenue of arms exports. In turn, new partners could provide us with industrial equipment and "know-how" in exchange for defense equipment that they need.

Paradoxically enough, preserving production of military hardware in Russia could help preserve peace in Europe.

First, production of combat hardware directly for the Russian Army would drop. Second, if we produced some systems and arms components for European countries, our partners themselves would cut this production accordingly. That will impel them to convert their military-industrial complexes. Third, military production would be internationalized, in other words it would not, as it were, be purely Russian.

Moreover, steady exports of spare parts for foreign and Russian military hardware might prove far more profitable than exporting the equipment itself. Thus the Urals could become the "weapons foundry" for the whole world. But the main point is that this could be the basis for Russia's integration into the system of world economic ties, whereby everyone produces what they do better and cheaper than the others.

It is well known that flotation admits the participation of foreign capital. Therefore it is quite possible that during the conversion process our future partners will be able to acquire some shares in enterprises producing armored hardware, aircraft, surface warships, and submarines. There is one condition for Russia: That its net hard-currency profit must increase dramatically.

Of course, Russia is now enfeebled and it will not soon become a world leader. However, we must extricate ourselves from the economic crisis as soon as possible. I do not think that we can improve our domestic market without breaking onto the foreign market.

From the Editorial Office: Material published under the "Viewpoint" rubric does not necessarily reflect the editorial office's stance.

Space Issues

Difficulties of 'Star Wars' Program Viewed

934E1424A Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Sep 93 Night Edition p 4

[Article by Igor Tsarev: "A 'Diamond-Studded' Sky: Should the Military, Who Maintain They Have Stopped Preparing for 'Star Wars,' Be Trusted?"]

[Text] After the numerous grandiose space launches of past decades, a mysterious "period of stagnation" set in in this area during the 1990's. Specialists concertedly complain of economic and financial difficulties... And the complaints are heard not only in Russia, which really is experiencing not the best of times, but also in prosperous America. Just what is happening?

It is difficult for the uninitiated to grasp the reasons for the "illness" which makes the space sector feverish today, for the conquest of outer space is cloaked in a mantle of beautiful legends. But in the given case legends have formed not just to glorify the truth, but also to distort or even conceal it altogether. And since access to reliable information still is blocked by the "stamp of secrecy," it is extraordinarily difficult to understand what is what. Therefore we will attempt merely to emphasize the "key" secrets of the Great Outer Space.

The first myth is about priority. We were taught to be proud that we always were the leaders in rocket building. But is this so? The "Guinness Book of Records" cites the following table of record rocket flights:

1931	Reinhold Tiling rocket	Germany	Flight altitude 2 km
1933	GIRD-Kh rocket	USSR	Altitude 5 km
1944	V-2 rocket	Germany	Altitude 190 km

Soviet reference works cite quite a different altitude ceiling for the V-2, up to 100 km, and this discrepancy is not accidental. The fact is that although there still are no precise international standards determining "where the sky ends and outer space begins," the majority of states have agreed that this boundary lies at an altitude of around 110 km. If Guinness is to be believed, this means that the German V-weapon, the superweapon which Hitler ordered to be fired on London, was first to ascend into outer space.

The second myth is about goals and missions. When talk turns to the conquest of outer space, the names of Tsiolkovskiy, Tsander and other Russian dreamers, who dreamed of "dusty paths of other planets," surface in the memory of people far removed from this area... But all this is very far from the truth.

In the USSR, which launched around 2,300 spacecraft since October 1957, at least 1,400 were intended for military missions. Around another 300 launches had a dual purpose.

And even what we have become accustomed to calling "peaceful cosmonautics" had a secret bottom.

Only the specialists know that at least three of our seven peaceful orbital laboratories launched under the name "Salyut" were in reality called "Almaz" [Diamond]. What is the meaning of this strange maskirovka ["camouflage"]? The fact is that the Almaz space complex, the project of which was approved in 1967, was conceived by Academician Chelomey's Design Bureau (now the Mashinostroyeniye NPO) as a military orbital station. According to the project, it even was outfitted with a rapid-fire gun designed by A. Nudelman. Exclusively for self-defense, the specialists explained to me, should someone suddenly decide to board the orbital complex...

The third myth is "Do the Russians want war?" The U.S. president proclaimed the celebrated "Strategic Defense Initiative" [SDI] on 23 March 1983.

In response to Reagan's announcement, the Soviet Union called on all people of the world to act in concert against the militarization of outer space. And such a position could only be welcomed were it not that the USSR itself did not have clean hands.

Soviet military specialists initially deemed nuclear warheads to be the best means for destroying enemy spacecraft, and in the fall of 1962 the USSR conducted three test nuclear explosions in outer space (at an altitude of 400 km). True, it was learned that such a method has an essential drawback—not just "enemy," but also friendly satellites are disabled in the vicinity of the burst. Therefore scientists began working on other methods of space battles.

...19 October 1968. Kosmos-248 went into near earth orbit. Kosmos-249 was launched from Baykonur on the following day. On the second revolution this craft approached Kosmos-248 and blew up. An accident? No. TASS announced that "planned scientific research was performed."

...1 November 1968. One more craft (Kosmos-252) flew by Kosmos-248 at a distance of one kilometer and also blew up. Western observers were left with no doubt that the USSR was testing an antisatellite weapon system.

Guidance that was excessively precise for nuclear explosions indicated that other kinds of destructive charges were used. What could this be? It can be assumed that it was a "means" unique for those times which our specialists called "cherries in syrup." Our missilemen successfully used such a charge in testing the V-1000 ABM interceptor back in 1961. It was filled with 16,000 steel balls with TNT, which at that time smashed an "attacking" R-12 ballistic missile to smithereens.

...20 October 1970. The Kosmos-373 target satellite went into orbit and was intercepted by Kosmos-374 and Kosmos-375, in turn. The game of tag continued. As a result of many years of intensive tests, in 1977 the USSR became the only country with an effective, operating antisatellite system. It remained for the United States only to dream of such a thing. And this was confirmed in particular by the "seven hours nuclear war" which the Soviet Armed Forces started in 1982 (which shook the West and was practically unknown to us).

...18 June 1982. A ballistic missile launched by a Soviet submarine burst from beneath the waters of the White Sea. Immediately afterward, another two Soviet SS-11 ICBM's flew out of shore silos. Later an SS-20 IRBM rose into the sky and the Kosmos-1379 combat satellite rushed into near earth orbit from the Tyuratam (Baykonur) launch complex...

Alarms sounded at U.S. observation stations. Fortunately, military activity on USSR territory did not signify real combat operations. This was only an exercise. But what an exercise!

SS-11 and SS-20 missiles simulating a first strike against the United States and Europe were successfully destroyed by our own ABM-X-3 ABM interceptors. At this same time, "to keep the Americans from pinpointing our launch positions" from near earth orbit, our combat station destroyed "their reconnaissance satellite," whose role was played by Kosmos-1379 and Kosmos-1375. In addition, another two missiles were launched from Plesetsk and Baykonur carrying photoreconnaissance and navigational satellites "for prompt replacement of spacecraft lost during combat operations"... These large-scale and brilliantly conducted firings and maneuvers once again demonstrated the might of Soviet Space Troops to the West. And possibly it was this exercise, named the "seven-hours nuclear war," that prompted Reagan to make his announcement about the SDI Program.

Having existed for a decade, the SDI Program happily passed away—at least that is what U.S. Secretary of Defense L. Aspin recently declared. But can this be believed? It seems too early to be at ease. The fact is that a tough struggle of information and disinformation constantly went on (and goes on today) in the "star wars" area. Here are only a few examples.

An interview with Lieutenant General (Retired) G. Kisunko, general designer of ABM interceptor systems, slipped into the press early this year. In particular, he related the following:

"The Americans tried to shove us into S&T dead ends by using false information. For example, a canard appeared in the newspaper back in 1956 that they were working on a method of destroying missiles by focussed SHF-band radio beams. This was reported to Marshal Zhukov, and he ordered that it be looked into. At that time it was successfully proven that this was something unrealizable, but in June 1984 even a U.S. patent, High Energy Microwave Defense System, was published in the U.S. press. The disinformation partially worked and personnel, funds and, most important, time, were wasted on dead-end research."

It would appear that Kisunko is rather competent in this matter, for at one time he worked in the Military Signal Academy specifically on SHF electrodynamics. But a curious thing happened. Literally a month after the interview with the general an article appeared, this time in another newspaper, in which Academician R. Avramenko painted a picture of a powerful Russian weapon based on the emission of SHF-generators and capable of burning up missiles and satellites in the sky and in outer space. The academician even suggested that the United States take part in a joint experiment to test this weapon. Whom are we to believe, the general or the academician?

Here is another example. In discussing "star wars," Academician Ye. Velikhov was very skeptical about the

capabilities of combat lasers. His attitude toward them was well reflected in particular in USSR Academy of Sciences materials published in *Izdatelstvo Nauka* in 1987. But just a couple of months after this digest left the printing house, the USSR sent the Skif-DM craft into space for perfecting a combat system with a laser weapon. And judging from everything, only a booster rocket accident kept our country from acquiring a space combat laser unit... By the way, in that same 1987, if one is to believe western reports, the Americans successfully used lasers to shoot down targets flying at low speed. And soon at White Sands, New Mexico the U.S. Navy used a chemical laser to destroy a missile, this time flying at supersonic speed.

As you see, it is difficult for the uninitiated to understand this artful design of truth and untruth cemented in a common monolith by the stamp of secrecy. And so I offer apologies in advance if somewhere I committed an inaccuracy or omitted some important fact, for I tried to analyze the situation based only on "unclassified data." But even these data state that beginning with the V-2 flights, the military did not concede a step to "peaceful cosmonautics" in continuing to play the title role in the conquest of near earth orbits. Rather than signifying the Americans' categorical rejection of the struggle to win military superiority in outer space, the "failure" of the SDI Program most likely is based on tactical premises. And there are confirmations of this. Literally a week before the speech by the U.S. secretary of defense, who gave up SDI for lost, the western press reported that this same department sent Congress a report announcing that combat laser experiments are continuing.

Nevertheless, the warming of relations between the United States and Russia has done its job. The space arms race no longer seems to politicians to be a paramount task. This also could not help but affect "peaceful cosmonautics." Alas, the fact is that up to now it has been only one of the numerous buttons on the military uniform....

Negotiations With U.S. on Joint Project

LD0610190993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1746 GMT 6 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow October 6 TASS—"Very considerable progress" has been made at the U.S.-Russian negotiations on the project "Mir-Shuttle," according to NASA Director Daniel Golding. Golding and Director of the Russian Space Agency Yuriy Koptev informed reporters on Wednesday about the results of their meeting in Moscow on October 3-6.

The two sides managed to achieve full understanding as regards the first stage of the programme, which covers the period from 1994-1997 and provides for flights by Russian cosmonauts and American astroauts on board

the "Mir" orbital station and the "Space-Shuttle" spaceship, as well as joint research. Koptev told reporters. The second and third stages, which he described as "a tangle of political, economic and scientific problems," are to be more complicated. The point at issue is the creation of an international orbital complex and carrying out research aboard it. Nevertheless, certain progress has been made in this field as well, the Russian space agency's director reported, which gives every ground to hope that the intergovernmental U.S.-Russian agreements will be implemented to time.

Answering a question from an ITAR-TASS correspondent, Koptev said the sides were now negotiating possible installation of Russian and U.S.-made equipment at the already existing block of stations "Mir-2." In future, this unit may become an international station in case the project is joined by the European Space Agency, Canada and Japan. The present meeting paid much attention to substantiate the viability and effectiveness of this proposal.

Defense Ministry on State of Space Forces

LD1510132393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1159 GMT 15 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—The loss of an entire range of installations of the Russian space forces in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union called for new, unconventional moves to ensure control over spacecraft. Despite considerable financial difficulties, the commandment of the Russian space forces has succeeded in ensuring reliable control over groups of satellites designed for a variety of purposes and maintaining the necessary infrastructure.

This was announced at a working meeting of Russia's space force leaders chaired by First Deputy Defence Minister Andrey Kokoshin here.

Only two countries in the world—the United States and Russia—have developed infrastructure for operating means in space.

The Russian Defence Ministry, which is also suffering from lack of funding, has reshuffled all available resources and compressed research and development projects to ensure the provision of latest technologies to the space forces, a spokesman for the ministry told ITAR-TASS.

Andrey Kokoshin told the conference in Moscow that an ever increasing attention is being centered on dual-purpose technologies which can be effectively used also in the national economy.

The space forces closely collaborate with the Russian space agency, leading enterprises, the state committee for the industry and the Communications Ministry. One

result of their close cooperation is the full-scale functioning of the global satellite navigational system Glonass, which is superior to the U.S. system Navstar in a number of respects.

The working meeting in Moscow decided on a number of practical measures aimed at retaining highly-qualified specialists in research institutes and design bureaus, as well as at enterprises backing up the space forces. The meeting also decided to concentrate the space force orders to the most advanced and promising enterprises of Russia.

Conference on Space Forces' Future

PM1810135993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Oct 93 p 1

[Russian Federation Defense Ministry Information and Press Directorate report "Space Forces: Quest for Unorthodox Solutions"]

[Text] First Deputy Defense Minister A. Kokoshin was briefed on the state of affairs at a main Russian Space Forces facility and chaired a working conference with leading Space Forces personnel.

Discussion specifically focused on questions of providing technical support for this, one of the Armed Forces' science-intensive organisms.

Only two countries in the world—Russia and the United States—possess a highly developed infrastructure for providing the space hardware which primarily determines a country's real power in this sphere, a sphere that is becoming increasingly important for civilian and military tasks.

The loss of a whole series of Space Forces facilities because of the Union's disintegration has demanded new and unorthodox solutions in ensuring spacecraft control.

It was noted during the conference that, despite considerable financing difficulties, the Space Forces command is stepping up its efforts to ensure the stable control of satellite groupings with various purposes and the maintenance of the entire infrastructure that is needed.

By optimally utilizing the meager resources allocated for defense needs, reducing the list of articles produced, and integrating research and development work, the Defense Ministry is still managing to supply the Space Forces with new and the latest equipment in a number of areas.

Kokoshin stressed that growing attention in developing the Space Forces is being devoted to dual-purpose technologies which could have maximum application in the national economy. The Space Forces are collaborating closely with the Russian Space Agency, leading enterprises, the State Committee for Industrial Policy, and the Communications Ministry. Specifically, the "Glonass" global satellite navigation system, which is superior to the U.S. "Navstar" system in a many regards, is now almost fully functional under Space Forces command.

During the conference a number of practical measures were outlined, aimed at retaining the most highly-skilled cadres in research institutes and design bureaus and at plants providing backup for the Space Forces and at concentrating Space Forces orders in the strongest and most promising Russian enterprises.

TV Program on Military Role in Space Program

PM1910122593 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0850 GMT 16 Oct 93

[From the "Aerospace Salon" program: Video report by Aleksandr Galkin, identified by caption, on Military Space Forces: figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [084946] [Galkin over aerial views of Baykonur] This is the Baykonur Cosmodrome. Baykonur marks the beginning of the history of Russia's Military Space Forces in 1955, although they emerged as an independent structure much later, at the beginning of the eighties. Initially, they were known as space units.

The jurisdiction of the Military Space Forces, if I may put it this way, currently encompasses the Baykonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, Plesetsk in Arkhangelsk Oblast, the Main Command and Telemetry Complex in Moscow Oblast, and tracking stations located between the western borders and Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands, and also various backup services. It is possible to say openly now that it was the military who secured all the space launches from the first sputnik to international space crew missions. I recall with embarrassment how, under pressure of censorship, we forced officers and servicemen to change into civilian clothes, how entire sequences were edited out of broadcasts if a service cap could be glimpsed somewhere in the background. And that at a time when the military's participation in the Soviet space program was no longer a secret anywhere in the world. They were true outcasts—in the words of a Baykonur song—stripped even of their uniform and title. Thankfully, the military space units are no longer required to engage in a masquerade now. However, this does not mean in the least that there are no real secrets left. Doubtless they do exist, and they are as closely guarded as before.

The very first steps in rocket technology showed that without tracking the object in question, without precise trajectory measurements it was impossible to perform experiments, let alone combat launches. Naturally, the advent of spacecraft called for a more powerful command and telemetry complex, capable not only of tracking the progress of a satellite or a manned spacecraft in orbit but also of controlling their flight, transmitting orders to the spacecraft, receiving information from space, and forecasting flight parameters. Every space launch is preceded by complex, painstaking preparations. Scientists, communications personnel, navigators, and geologists compile a flight program. And military

ballistics experts use this program as the basis for calculating timings for blast-off, payload separation and orbit insertion, optimum trajectories, timings of dockings and undockings in the case of manned flights, and much else besides. However, no matter how carefully and painstakingly the preliminary mathematical models are calculated, the satellites and spacecraft are launched into orbits which are merely an approximation of the calculated orbits. The reasons for this are manifold. The unevenness of the Earth's gravitation, varying atmospheric friction, and bursts of solar activity. All these little deviations have to be measured and incorporated in a program of necessary corrections. Incidentally, solar flares raise such a powerful solar wind that even the highly buoyant Mir orbital station loses several kilometers of altitude. It is once again the military who take these orbital measurements. Commands from the flight control center in Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast, to activate vernier engines are transmitted via their communication channels.

According to specialist information, more than 7,500 disused satellites, delivery vehicle fragments, nose fairings, and other items of space garbage are currently orbiting the Earth. Pollution in space is not as harmless as might appear at first glance. Collision with debris at a speed of 28,000 km/h is liable to cause the destruction of very expensive satellites, or worse. A metal fragment could pierce a manned spacecraft right through. So the military operators have to track even nonoperational objects and adjust launch timings to avoid trouble. Should a serious accident occur in space, specialists at the command and telemetry complex define in advance the likely touchdown area and, if possible, divert the endangered payload to a higher orbit.

The highest skills are needed to manage space facilities. These cannot be acquired in a year or two. This is one of the Military Space Forces' key problems today. After all, officers are retired just like elsewhere in the Army at the age of 45 to 50. Yet at this age mathematicians, ballistics experts, and programmers are at the height of their creative power. The Russian Military Space Forces are currently pinning great hopes on contract service, which would make it possible to hold on to the vast intellectual potential accumulated in the subunits. For example, doctors of sciences and several dozen candidates of sciences are currently working at the Main Center. However, for the time being their scientific degrees are not being rewarded. At the same time, commercial structures are very willing to engage military programmers and pay them considerably more than the officers responsible for keeping near-Earth space tidy are getting. How can this unique system, as yet unaffected by state borders and capable of coping with any problems apart from political ones, be preserved? Unquestionably the staffing problems are complex, but hopefully they are not insoluble. After all, appropriations for space programs are already producing tangible returns in the implementation of national economic and military tasks. Unfortunately our history is full of examples where in order to

make small savings we later lost out heavily. Space systems must not be allowed to fall hostage to the ruble. [Video shows aerial view of Baykonur, exterior, interior of main command center, radoms, aerial view of snow-covered launch pad, closeup of carrier on launch pad, tracking dishes, operators at consoles, more dishes, pre-launch preparation at Ministry of Defense assembly and testing complex, closeups of launch pad, series of launches, pictures from outer space.]

International Space Projects

LD1910104293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0932 GMT 19 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikita Yermakov]

[Text] Paris October 19 TASS—Countries-members of the European Space agency (ESA), Canada, the United States and Japan plan to invite the Russian Government to study the possibility of taking part in their international space station project. This decision was adopted during a meeting of representatives from the foregoing countries, held in the French capital. ITAR-TASS learned on Monday evening [18 October] from their joint declaration released here.

The partners have reached agreement to step up consultations in this domain and have authorised the departments concerned to draw up plans for Russia's inclusion in the international space station project, which will be submitted to the corresponding governments, the document notes.

This programme exists since 1988 and envisages the creation of a permanent manned orbital station. Its use for peaceful purposes is to mark the next step in space exploration.

The participants of the meeting have noted that Russia, which possesses huge experience in space exploration and in the operation of manned orbital stations, is in a position to contribute substantially to the implementation of this programme. Russia's participation in it may also expand the sphere of cooperation with that country, the declaration notes.

Russian Ambassador to U.S. on Ukraine

BR2610102093 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 24 Oct 93
p14

[Interview with Vladimir Petrovich Lukin, Russian ambassador to the United States, by Sergio Sergi in Moscow; date not given: "Allied to U.S., But With Dignity"]

[Text] **Sergi:** Mr. Ambassador, let us begin with the rumors that you have been dismissed. What happened?

Lukin: There are always so many rumors, and those about my dismissal are not the latest ones. Moscow is full of gossip. Yesterday there was talk of the dismissal of Gerashchenko, the head of the central bank.

Sergi: What happened?

Lukin: Who knows? Moscow is full of intrigue. The same thing happens in Rome, does it not?

Sergi: I cannot say you are wrong.

Lukin: As a Foreign Ministry official, I cannot comment on the rumors. As you can see, I am here, still doing my job. Another thing is that I have decided to take part in the election campaign. I think that all my experience could be useful to the new parliament.

Sergi: Does that decision fit in with your functions as an ambassador? You have chosen an opposition bloc.

Lukin: I will not say. There are two broad ranges in the political lineup. The "bloc" I have joined, and which has attracted three names (Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, Yury Boldyrev, and Lukin) is part of the democratic lineup.

Sergi: I do not doubt it...

Lukin: ... and I would say that, at local level, there is an agreement among the various blocs fighting for market reform and democratic change on single candidates in uninominal constituencies. What I can tell you is that I do not like any type of radicalism.

Sergi: What about the ideas supported by Burbulis (former secretary of state—L'UNITA editor's note)?

Lukin: In a revolutionary and reformist movement there is always a fringe consisting of people who have not made the grade in their profession and want to bypass civilized methods so they can get to the top quickly. These people usually advance ideas like: Let us destroy the current civilization and create a new, more beautiful one. And let us do it quickly and abruptly, bypassing civilized methods and history. They are doing what Mayakovsky said: Let us bypass the horse of history. However, I do not intend to deceive or cheat my destiny or career. I repeat: Let us take action within the context of history and society by seeking to improve it. We are not pure opposition; we too have our differences about how to implement change. We are joined by Yegor Yakovlev, who could be said to embody the onset of democratic reform. In short, we are not just another democratic bloc; we are "the" democratic bloc. And we are concerned—perhaps more than the others—that change should come about using peaceful and democratic methods, and without bloodshed.

Sergi: But Yavlinsky is taking a hardline opposition stance.

Lukin: Being part of an electoral bloc does not rule out differences in approach. Each person has his or her own temperament. Yavlinsky, for example, is young, energetic, and a little sharp. I, on the other hand, am more experienced. Here we say that there is unity in diversity.

Sergi: You were a mediator, albeit a critical one, at the Congress of Deputies in December 1992. Did you also have an opportunity to mediate during October's events around the White House?

Lukin: Yes, and I feel personally at fault. There were insufficient forces, and the convictions and intellectual resources were insufficient to reach a compromise. I am firmly against revolutions and firmly in favor of compromise. We have had too much radicalism. Russia is too big a ship to engage in these types of maneuvers, with millions of people being thrown into the water.

Sergi: You are opposed to radicalism. Is that what you do not like about certain actions taken by the leadership?

Lukin: I am well disposed toward, say, Yegor Gaydar. However, in the Democratic Russia movement in particular, there are people who—for the sake of the country's "happiness"—would sacrifice the country itself. That is very dangerous. It will not have gone unnoticed that those involved in the Russia's Choice movement have chosen Peter I on horseback as their symbol. They are well aware of who Peter I was: He implemented reforms using extremely violent methods.

Sergi: As ambassador, how did you report events to the U.S. Administration on 21 September, the day of the decree dissolving parliament, and then later, on 4 October, at the time of the assault?

Lukin: I am the ambassador and I therefore take the official line. I would have to resign if I were against it. That is what I truly think. I am perfectly aware that the president's act was not written in the existing Constitution, but it had become impossible to carry on. I understood his decree. In addition, we did everything we could to avoid violence. Once again, our generation was unable to avoid spilling blood, although I do not think it was totally inevitable.

Sergi: Did Washington request an explanation on the day of the assault?

Lukin: The United States felt that the decisions made were inevitable after the "other side" began the armed revolt. However, the U.S. Administration then said that its support was not unconditional, but was linked to respect of the democratic rules and free elections. I do not see anything illogical in that. This must be seen as a viewpoint, not as an attempt to direct us. If the United States wanted to direct our path, then that would obviously be unacceptable from the viewpoint of our dignity. It would also be completely fruitless. The United States understands that.

Sergi: As a candidate, do you think that the conditions for free elections have already been met?

Lukin: The campaign has not started yet. I am concerned about the rules constantly changing and the lack of clarity over the Constitution. I would prefer it if, instead of a referendum, there were a debate in the new parliament first. I am also concerned about the extremely short

amount of time granted for gathering signatures: 100,000 in the course of a week, and in no fewer than seven regions.

Sergi: Can you explain how things stand with regard to NATO's offers to Russia?

Lukin: I think it is completely natural. The world has changed and NATO has changed, too. So, all in all, it is quite normal. However, this is part of the complex problem of creating a new security system in Europe. It is primarily a problem for NATO, and for its relations with the CSCE and the Council of Europe. There is also the question of the pace of expansion. It seems to me that people want to do a little bit at a time: first one country joining, then another, with Russia hanging back until later. This could cause serious mistrust, and could lead to a special sort of national psychosis and a chauvinistic movement.

Sergi: Are you talking about membership for Hungary, Poland, etc.?

Lukin: You see, I would feel uneasy: those countries first, and not Russia? This is a consideration linked to national security problems because, in the world of real politics, it is not a question of a "good" bloc and a "bad" bloc. The point is that this bloc will include neighboring countries with whom we have traditionally had difficult relations. Why should they be in it and not us? This bloc might be good today but not tomorrow. If we are concerned for European security, we must not forget that there could be a return to bipolar politics. It is easy for mistrust, worries, fears, and false perceptions to arise.

Sergi: Has the United States understood this?

Lukin: This problem exists in its political analysis. Our dialogue with the United States is quite fruitful. It is not a question of whether we should be partners, but of what form that partnership should take. That is the problem that has to be addressed when discussing new members joining NATO.

Sergi: Will everything be resolved at the January summit between Yeltsin and Clinton?

Lukin: Intense talks are under way, but I have the feeling that there is no hurry either on the U.S.' or Europe's part.

Sergi: What issues will be discussed at the summit?

Lukin: Oh! January is still quite a way off. There will be a lot of work to do: from domestic problems in both countries—for even the United States has its troubles, does it not?—to bilateral relations in the area of investments. I am talking about investments in Russia. There is also the matter of security and nonproliferation, and here I am thinking of Ukraine.

Sergi: In what sense?

Lukin: In the sense that the Lisbon agreements have not been respected. Ukraine will not allow Russian specialists, whose job it is to monitor nuclear missiles, to enter the country. This is a problem that certainly concerns Europeans. One Chernobyl was more than enough. The experts say that unless we provide safeguards in the near future...

Sergi: Is there a real danger?

Lukin: Nuclear arms must receive constant maintenance. For the time being, however, Russian experts are not being given access, even though Kiev does not have the resources to maintain the arms. That is dangerous.

Commentary on CFE Process

PM2110135393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Oct 93 p 3

[Article by Manki Ponomarev: "Moving Away From Flank Restrictions. The CFE Treaty and Realities of Life"]

[Text] I have already had occasion—in the article "Is Moscow's Opinion Heeded in NATO?" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 October 1993)—to write about the reaction abroad to Russia's appeal to the leaders of the leading Western countries in connection with the plans to enlarge the bloc. This appeal gave rise to quite a lot of contradictory reactions. But maybe even more misinterpretations were caused by another message from the Russian Federation president—this time addressed to the leaders of a number of states party to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty) and devoted to bringing this document into line with existing military-political realities.

The point is that the treaty was formulated in completely different conditions to those which have developed today. It was formulated in conditions of bloc confrontation. Since then the cold war era has vanished into oblivion. The Warsaw Pact Organization is no more. The Soviet Union has ceased to exist. And the result is that certain provisions of the treaty which caused no particular doubts or objections at the time it was signed have now become manifestly at variance with real life. They are creating artificial obstacles to the strengthening of trust and cooperation, retarding the building of new relations among the participant countries, and could even revive outdated concepts from the period of direct military confrontation.

We are talking first and foremost about the flank restrictions on armament levels imposed by the CFE Treaty. When it was being formulated the intention was that these restrictions would apply, in particular, to all USSR armed forces stationed in the north and south of the European part of the country. But after that a number of independent states emerged on the country's territory and the quotas set for the Soviet Union were divided up among its successors—Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine. And the result is that

of the maximum overall total for our country of 6,400 tanks, 11,480 armored fighting vehicles, and 6,415 artillery systems in regular units in the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts, which make up the Russian flank area, after 1995 the treaty will permit the presence in regular units of no more than 700 tanks, 580 armored fighting vehicles, and 1,280 artillery systems. Yet these two military districts cover more than half of the European part of Russia's territory, not to mention the fact that they are both border districts.

So the flank restrictions in practice place Russia in a situation of totally unjustified discrimination. The structure of regional restrictions enables all parties to the treaty (except the Russian Federation and Ukraine) to station troops and conventional arms throughout their territory as they see fit. Russia is unable to do this, however, even in areas where it needs to in the interests of safeguarding its security. The flank restrictions compel our country to concentrate the bulk of its conventional arms not where the situation requires—in the south, for example—but along the old East-West line; that is, along the western borders and in tiny Kaliningrad Oblast.

It is no secret that the situation in the southern sector (the Caucasus and adjoining areas) where there are large numbers of armed formations equipped with even heavy equipment and not under the jurisdiction of central authorities, requires a weighty Russian military presence there as a stabilizing factor. Another substantial factor is that there is a developed infrastructure there for stationing some of the troops withdrawn from the territory of other states, and favorable local conditions make possible considerable expenditure savings on providing facilities for them. Whereas the stationing of withdrawn troops in less habitable areas could lead to the growth of social tension in the Army. It was the precisely need to rectify the situation that was addressed in the Russian Federation president's letter to the leaders of a number of CFE Treaty countries. Furthermore, according to reliable information available to the writer, the letter particularly stressed that, despite the mismatch between a few of its provisions and the new situation in Europe, Russia remains committed to the treaty and has made a firm choice in favor of preserving its integrity. At the same time, however, the time has come to think about how to align it with the new realities and jettison the attributes of the cold war so that individual provisions of the treaty do not come into conflict with the interests of the parties to it. The letter also indicates a possible mechanism for adapting the treaty to present-day conditions—in particular within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group session being held in Vienna.

In brief, the letter gave no grounds for the speculation by a number of foreign press organs that Russia is categorically insisting on a revision of the treaty and demanding for itself the right to violate it and sharply build up its heavy arms in the North Caucasus.

The constructiveness of Russia's attitude is also evidenced by the speeches delivered by its representatives at the session of the Joint Consultative Group on the CFE Treaty. Thus Ambassador Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, head of the Russian delegation, proposed that Article 5 of the treaty, which deals with flank restrictions, be suspended, without being amended or rescinded. Such a solution would be based on a number of precedents and generally accepted world practice and would not entail alteration of the text of the treaty. The treaty could be adopted in full in 1995-1996, but an interim option could be formulated until a definitive solution is found.

Yet another approach to solving the problems of flank restrictions was advanced in a speech to the Joint Consultative Group by Lieutenant General Vladimir Zhurbenko, first deputy chief of staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It essentially involved recategorizing the North Caucasus Military District from a flank district, as Article 5 of the treaty designates it, to a rear district, which would not be affected by the cited restrictions on quantities of arms stationed there.

It is important to stress that in addressing its flank problems Russia is not jeopardizing the security of any party to the treaty. Furthermore, we are ready, in particular, to reduce our grouping in the Leningrad Military District by between half and two-thirds by the end of 1995. Nor do we intend to have more conventional arms than necessary in the North Caucasus Military District.

These are the concrete ideas spelled out by Russian representatives in amplification of the Russian Federation president's letter. They are currently being actively discussed. Nevertheless a solution to the problem of flank restrictions for Russia has still not been found. A few representatives of states party to the treaty are sympathetic to our concern. Maybe only Turkey has taken a sharply negative attitude to Moscow's wishes. But our treaty partners are in no hurry, explaining their restraint in terms of fears that steps toward an accommodation with the Russian proposals could lead to a chain reaction of revisions of other provisions of the treaty and ultimately to its complete revision and collapse.

It is difficult to say which is more in evidence here—genuine fears or deviousness. After all there is nothing out of line in our proposals. Complex questions have already been resolved within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group to mutual satisfaction. This happened, for example, when there were discussions on the problems of marine and coast guard arms or the fate of arms relocated to the Urals. It also happened when the borders of the area covered by the treaty were redesignated as a result of the exclusion from it of the territory of the Baltic states or the expansion of the number of participant states to 30. Why not continue this process?

But forces with no desire to ease the burden of the problems which have overwhelmed Russia are evidently mobilizing here. It is currently disadvantageous for them

to pursue their line out in the open. But behind the scenes they are able to obstruct the realization of Moscow's proposals or cause a fuss in the press over the Russian president's messages. Nevertheless the problem of flank restrictions will have to be resolved. Otherwise Russia will be faced with a dilemma: either accepting the discriminatory situation and neglecting its security—which is out of the question, of course—or adopting unilateral appropriate measures to safeguard it. There is no other option.

PRC Nuclear Test Seen Aiding Russian Testing Proponents

94WC0005A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian No 42,
13 Oct 93

[Article by Oleg Volkov, under rubric "Explosion": "A Chinese Present to the International Nuclear Mafia"]

[Text] **The nuclear explosion on the Lobnor Plateau on 5 October buried any hopes of signing the international treaty to ban nuclear tests.**

It is obvious that this escapade—and it really is absolutely unimportant whose escapade it was specifically—had been impatiently awaited by definite circles in all the countries in the "nuclear club." The fact of the matter is that the two-year moratorium that had been proclaimed by Russia, the United States, Great Britain, and France, seems to many specialists in the field of atomic weapons to be obviously prolonged. In addition, the "green" parliamentarians in those countries, with the support of the countries in Scandinavia and the Pacific Ocean region, applied all possible efforts to assure that, with the passage of time, the moratorium would smoothly develop into the Treaty for the Universal Banning of Nuclear Explosions.

However, after the Chinese explosion on the Lobnor Plateau the signing of that agreement, which had been previously planned for 1996, already raises many doubts. Within literally only a few hours the United States and France announced their intention to carry out nuclear tests within the near future.

Officially, Russia did not react to the Chinese explosion. This is explained by extremely objective circumstances. The three responsible individuals in the government who have the right to clarify the Russian position in this question—the president, as well as the minister of defense and the minister for atomic energy—are engaged in resolving problems that are no less important. Boris Yeltsin, as everyone knows, has left for Japan; Pavel Grachev apparently will continue to be engaged for a long time in stabilizing the atmosphere of political morale in the army; and Viktor Mikheylov, RF minister for atomic energy, is already in the second week of analyzing the "mutinous" Kola AES (the station director had been fired by a ministry decision, and the labor collective, threatening to go on strike, is demanding his reinstatement).

In a word, in this kind of situation there cannot be any official statement by the Russian leadership. However, this definitely does not mean that Russia will remain aloof from the chain reaction that was set off by the Chinese or that it will not renew the tests in Novaya Zemlya. As everyone knows, our country has already announced two moratoriums on nuclear tests (in 1958-1961 and 1985-1987), each of which ended with a powerful series of explosions "in the interests of state security."

"The Chinese explosion is simply a present for the international nuclear Mafia," says Nikolay Vorontsov, the last chairman of USSR Goskomprirody [State Committee for Environmental Protection and Natural Resources], who currently heads the Russian department of the Globe international nongovernmental ecological organization. "You can see how quickly the Americans and the French reacted. Directive instructions were issued within the shortest periods of time to prepare tests in Nevada and on Moruroa atoll. Although it is completely obvious that the relatively weak explosion on Lobnor does not represent any threat to the national security of the countries that participated in the moratorium that has been lasting more than two years: Russia, the United States, France, and Great Britain. The first reaction of our military—IZVESTIYA published several indignant statements by Russian generals—definitely pleases me. But, on the other hand, it is obvious that Russian Minatom [RF Ministry of Atomic Energy] will not lose this 'golden' opportunity to renew nuclear tests. This means additional appropriations, credit, and some kind of guarantee of comfortable existence."

"That is, it is no longer possible to dream about the banning of nuclear test?"

"I have not yet given up that hope. The Russian Globe sent out a message to the European, American, and Japanese parliamentarians, asking them to put up resistance to the nuclear lobby in their governments. Previously we succeeded in achieving tangible results by using these methods. For example, about two months ago, when Clinton suddenly began talking about suspending the moratorium and renewing the tests, supporters of Senator Kerry, the head of the American Globe, succeeded in changing their president's mind."

But even such fairly restrained optimism as Nikolay Nikolayevich Vorontsov's is definitely not shared by everyone. Russia remains a sufficiently independent country to fail to react to the protests by individual members of the world community (the Americans, apparently will not become indignant, and since the times of Peter [the Great] no one in our country has taken the opinion of Scandinavia seriously).

But within the country, after the recent events, there disappeared a natural, relatively serious factor that is restraining the aggressive actions of Minatom. Speaking truthfully, even previously one could not expect much

from the VS [Supreme Soviet], but nevertheless the nation's chosen representatives, the majority of whom had come to power by skillfully riding the ecological wave, periodically recalled their campaign promises.

As deplorable as this may be, it must be stated firmly that there does not exist in Russia today a force that is capable of holding the country back from becoming involved in the chain reaction. There can no longer be any massive ecological demonstrations, such as occurred two years ago: the peak of interest in activities to protect the environment has been passed, and it has become dangerous for "more than three" to gather. The Greenpeace Russia that has just barely got onto its feet, in the event of its very first "extremist escapade" that is typical of that organization, can be overtaken by the fate of the Communist Party or Trudovaya Rossiya [Labor Russia]. But the only official ecological agency—RF Minprirody [Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources]—in my opinion has not distinguished itself in its conflicts with Minatom.

Incidentally, in the opinion of specialists, there will not be any nuclear explosions unambiguously in Russia until the summer. At the Novaya Zemlya test range that remains at the disposal of our country's nuclear men, the polar night has already begun—under these conditions it would be necessary to expend much more funds, manpower, and time to prepare for the tests. In addition, the new parliament there is already being to operate at full height. So the spectral hope remains.

And one last thing. According to a report in IZVESTIYA, the Chinese who set off the chain reaction stated, literally a few hours after the explosion on Lobnor Plateau, their readiness in 1996 to annex themselves to the Treaty for the Universal Banning of Nuclear Explosions. If, of course, the need for that does not disappear completely by that time.

BELARUS

Expert Casts Doubt on Second Stage of Arms Reduction

LD1310223893 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2046 GMT 13 Oct 93

[Text] In an interview with INTERFAX, the head of the Belarussian National Control and Inspections Agency, Major General Viktor Vakar, has described the first stage of the republic's arms reduction program as "quite successful." However, he put into question the success of the next stage—destruction of up to 60 percent of combat planes, tanks, and armored vehicles—due to financial difficulties.

Vakar said that the republic had not received a single dollar from anybody so far, while the proposals of other states regarding their assistance in providing know-how and technologies for destructing the Belarussian hardware are of no use for the republic.

The high officer considers arms reduction to be a global concern and sees the way out of the situation in setting up an international fund to finance arms reductions. With such a fund, the world community could encourage certain states' moves toward peace. If the Vienna Joint Consultative Group gave permission to sell out part of the hardware to be destroyed, it would help Belarus to make a step forward in this direction, according to Vakar. His agency is now preparing a national program for fulfilling the republic's international commitments in regards to arms reductions, which will have a considerable impact on the state budget, he said.

U.S. Support Pledged During Secretary Christopher's Trip

*PM2610164293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1620 GMT 26 Oct 93*

[By BELINFORM correspondent Vladimir Glod and Aleksandr Lyushkevich for TASS]

[Text] Minsk October 26 TASS— U.S. State Secretary Warren Christopher, currently here on an official visit, told a news conference here today the U.S. wants to render support to Belarus, a dynamic state which carries out democratic reforms and actively develops bilateral relations with the United States.

The major aim of Christopher's Commonwealth tour is the reduction of nuclear arsenals and encouragement of states that are adherent to the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear arms. In his words, Minsk has done more in this respect than other states.

The state secretary confirmed the U.S. is interested in development of democratic processes in Belarus to manifest themselves in early elections of the republican Supreme Soviet in spring 1994. Christopher assured the U.S. is ready to render technical assistance to the elections.

Asked whether the U.S. is ready to help Belarus to eliminate conventional arms remaining on its territory from armies of the former soviet Union, the state secretary said this problem is discussed not only in Minsk but also in Washington where a Belarusian delegation headed by Defence Minister Pavel Kozlovskiy is staying.

KAZAKHSTAN

International Anti-Nuclear Congress Meets in Almaty

*934K2419A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 8 Sep 93 p 4*

[Article by Yuriy Kirinitsyanov, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent, Republic of Kazakhstan: "A Test Range Is No Place To Take a Walk: The International Antinuclear Congress Has Ended in Almaty"]

[Text] Sharman Kharney, an American Indian from the state of Nevada, is staring with all her might at Amantay Asylbekov, chief of staff of the "Attan" movement. Attan!—this is a battle cry of a Kazakh jumping on his steed and racing to meet danger. But Attan is also a part of the better known "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement, which is fighting to close the nuclear testing grounds on Lake Lob-Nor in neighboring China. This is far from being the internal affair of a neighboring country, according to Amantay, because Kazakh, Uygur, and Russian children get sick and die from the nuclear charges that explode 700 kilometers from Almaty. Amantay speaks heatedly and agitatedly. He spoke in Russian, but when he wanted to express his thoughts more clearly, he switched to his native Kazakh. He told about how thousands of citizens of sovereign Kazakhstan gathered at the border with China. Among them were also representatives from the other side who, however, tried to stay out of camera range. Beijing's official position, to put it mildly, is surprising. Here they are not hurrying to put an end to nuclear experiments. This is why the participation of Chinese citizens in antinuclear activities is not approved.

The woman interpreter, Gulya, could hardly keep up with the temperamental Amantay. But it was the kind of feeling that Sharman could understand without translation; their souls were tuned in to the same wavelength. And this was the wavelength of common participation and suffering. Actually, these same words could also be ascribed to many participants of the International Anti-nuclear Congress. Behind every one of them were separate countries with separate histories and their separate roads to Almaty—France, America, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and Germany—all of them united by a mutual concern about the future of their children.

This is a very valuable admission coming from the lips of an authoritative state official, whose psychology—and let us not forget that—was formed in many respects under the influence of a powerful popular movement. For 44 years of nuclear testing, Kazakhs have taken a lot of suffering, and they have every right to expect official organizations to recognize that they want something more tangible than just political declarations. This is why one of the sharpest and most painful subjects at the congress was a discussion on compensating victims for damages they have suffered. The republic has approved a law on compensation for damages caused by detonations at the Semipalatinsk proving grounds. Many participants at the congress, however, believe that the law "is working" poorly, does not take into account the huge inflation rates, and does not extend to inhabitants of Western Kazakhstan, which is far less known for its proving grounds, but actually even here there were 42 blasts, mockingly called "peaceful."

According to evidence obtained by Doctor of Medical Sciences A. Abdrakhmanov, an authoritative scholar who participated in the congress, the situation in the western part of the republic is more alarming than in

Semipalatinsk. The total number of underground, surface, and above ground detonations has never been conclusively clarified. The military created a powerful scientific complex in the Semipalatinsk area and for the sake of appearance carried out control over explosions and the health conditions of the local population. In the west, however, brigades were brought in from the outside that did their "heroic deeds," and the testing grounds were fenced off so tightly that not even a mouse could get through.

Radionuclides were found on the surface of the earth, and the water was contaminated. But the danger did not come only from underground, but literally fell on their heads. The military-industrial complex "saluted" the congress in its own peculiar way. Only one and a half kilometers from the village of Utera, on the border of Astrakhan and Atyrau (formerly Guryev) Oblasts, either a tactical or strategic missile fell to earth. Fortunately, it did not have a nuclear warhead.

If one takes into account that last year, due to the negligence of the military from a neighboring friendly country, namely Russia, the Kyzylkoginskiy district of Atyrau Oblast was fired upon, one can imagine the feelings that are overwhelming the residents of these areas. There were no victims either last year nor this, but neither was there even an elementary apology or compensation for damages, as is usually the case in normal countries.

Sharman Kharney, with whom I began this story on the congress, is a native Shoshone American Indian. To some people this name is familiar only from the books of James Fenimore Cooper. But for Sharman and her husband, Korbin, who also came to the congress, their history is their fate. The organization headed by Korbin is fighting for the rights of the native population of America and, first and foremost, for the right to live on unpoisoned ground, to breathe fresh air, and to have healthy children. "There was a time when I taught at an Indian school," Sharman told me, "but then I realized that my classroom was my entire world. I have to spread the faith to everyone and tell them that we are all children of Mother Earth."

This ancient Indian legend has taken on a new and symbolic meaning today. Sharman taught the participants of the congress one of her lessons.

During the break, guests wandered along a path planted with poplars. Sharman cut off a small branch in such a way that the sap came out in the shape of a little white star. "That is Mother Earth," she said, "sending us her greetings."

It was a fragile, tiny little star. Perhaps its fate was to become a guiding star, but not only for the Indian lady from the nuclear state of Nevada.

Baykonur Cosmodrome Still Financed Mainly by Russia

LD1610105293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2330 GMT 15 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS stringer Semen Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, 16 Oct [Moscow time]—The main task at Baykonur [in Kazakhstan] now is to prepare the cosmodrome and the town of Leninsk for the forthcoming winter, according to Colonel General Vladimir Ivanov, commander of the Russian Defense Ministry's Military Space Forces (MSF).

The MSF have, he said, already forwarded their share of the money for this purpose, 25.7 billion rubles [R], but the Russian Space Agency, which is supposed to transfer R2.1 billion, has so far sent only R140 million. The Republic of Kazakhstan should, according to the existing arrangement with Russia, make available to Baykonur R1.2 billion (six percent of total investment), but has released only R510 million to date. So the cosmodrome is being sustained mainly by allocations from Russia.

At another cosmodrome, Russia's Plesetsk, a development plan that appeared in May this year, following a visit to the cosmodrome by Russian President Boris Yeltsin (November 1992) and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev (March 1993) is currently being put into effect. The Russian Defense Ministry takes the view that the interests of Russia's defense capability can most certainly not be made dependent on the terms and policies of any foreign state, even if it is part of the CIS. So, the MSF will be able to carry out at Plesetsk many combat missions that were previously accomplished only at Baykonur.

As regards the main problems of using space for military purposes, including the problem of launching heavy booster rockets, the MSF must attain a new level at Plesetsk before 1996.

Relations With PRC Focus on Nuclear Testing Issues

Nazarbayev Gets Letter From Jiang Zemin Prior to Visit

LD1510163793 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 1500 GMT 15 Oct 93

[Text] The president's press service reports that on the eve of his visit to China, President Nazarbayev received a personal letter from PRC President Jiang Zemin. The letter refers to one sent by Nazarbayev on 30 September about his concern in connection with the nuclear test in China.

China displays full understanding for this concern about nuclear tests and Kazakhstan's stand concerning the moratorium on nuclear tests. The Chinese Government approaches this issue seriously and with responsibility,

the letter goes on to say, and makes every effort to reduce to the minimum the consequences of nuclear tests.

The Chinese head of state informed about his country's efforts to preserve security and stability in the world, and therefore his government stands for universal banning and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. China will never and under no circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons and confirms this with regard to the friendly state of Kazakhstan.

The letter contains high appraisal of the contribution made by Nazarbayev to deepen and develop these processes and expresses confidence that China and Kazakhstan, being two influential states in Asia, will take an active part in the efforts of the world public to create a nuclear-free world. Chinese-Kazakh relations should be raised to a higher level, and the forthcoming visit by Nazarbayev will promote a deeper exchange of opinions on all issues of mutual interest.

Nazarbayev Gives Interview in Beijing

*LD2010090493 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network
in Kazakh 0500 GMT 20 Oct 93*

[Excerpts] China actively supports the initiative of Kazakhstan on setting up a system of security and stability on the Asian continent. Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated this in his interview to Russian and Chinese journalists who are covering his visit to the PRC.

During the talks in Beijing, the president noted, the issue of Chinese nuclear tests at the Lop Nur testing site was raised. The Chinese side reaffirmed its readiness to any talks concerning the ban on nuclear weapons.

Characterizing the talks with Mr. Zemin, Nursultan Nazarbayev stressed the complete concurrence of opinions on almost all problems under discussion. [passage omitted on the necessity of developing commerce with China]

Speaking on the Chinese expertise in carrying out reforms, the president said: Reforms in this country are being implemented in a stable situation and without any chaos, as was the case with us in the beginning. [passage omitted]

U.S. Delegation Visits for Talks on START

*LD0110205993 Almaty Radio Almaty World Service
in English 1930 GMT 30 Sep 93*

[Text] Recently the Kazakhstan minister of defense, Sagadat Nurmagambetov, met with a U.S. delegation in Almaty, the capital of Kazakhstan.

The Americans participated in the talks on dismantling the nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. During the meeting, issues concerning the implementation of the strategic offensive armaments limitation treaty were discussed.

Kazakhstan Admitted as Member of IAEA

*LD2809121693 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network
in Kazakh 0700 GMT 28 Sep 93*

[Summary] The 37th regular session of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] Committee in Vienna has admitted Kazakhstan as a member to this international agency.

Talks Held With U.S. Delegation at Defense Ministry

*LD2409090993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0721 GMT 24 Sep 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Kulagin]

[Text] Almaty September 24 TASS—Problems pertaining to the practical implementation of the treaty to reduce and restrict strategic offensive weapons were discussed here today during talks with a U.S. delegation, dealing with problems of dismantling nuclear weapons in the former republics of the USSR.

The Kazakh delegation was led by Defence Minister Sagadat Nurmagambetov, and the American—by Ambassador James Goodby.

Both sides noted with satisfaction the identity of their views on the need to consistently fulfil the commitments assumed under the treaty and the Lisbon Protocol to it.

Touching on problems, linked with the dismantling of strategic offensive weapons, the head of the American delegation expressed readiness to render Kazakhstan technical assistance and financial aid, which would not affect the interests of its sovereignty and security, as well as the interests of third states.

KYRGYZSTAN

Military Calls for National Nuclear Free Zone

*LD2909182993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1715 GMT 29 Sep 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Mainayev]

[Text] Bishkek September 29 TASS—The Kyrgyz State Committee for Defence has come out for proclaiming the whole territory of Kyrgyzstan to be a nuclear free zone.

The development of the Kyrgyz military concept has been completed on Wednesday. The concept has a purely defensive character and envisages close cooperation with armies of all CIS countries on the basis of the inviolability of the existing borders.

In a few days, documents to this effect will be submitted to the national parliament for approval.

UKRAINE

Secretary Of State Christopher Visits CIS

Holds Talks in Ukraine

*LD2510222493 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 25 Oct 93*

[Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk received U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher on 25 October, who had arrived in Kiev during the course of a tour of East European countries and the CIS. During their conversation, Kravchuk emphasized that relations with the United States of America were a priority for Ukrainian foreign policy. He, in particular, pointed out that the security of states in the world nowadays depended on the scope of mutually beneficial cooperation rather than the size of nuclear arsenals.

The Ukrainian president emphasized that our state's course toward achieving non-nuclear status in the future, which was declared by the Ukrainian parliament, was unchanged. The main thing now is to define and to find specific ways and mechanisms to achieve this aim.

The Ukrainian president added that the destruction of nuclear weapons was a complex matter requiring considerable effort and funds. At present, Ukraine—both from an economic and technological viewpoint—is incapable of performing tremendous work to eliminate its nuclear arsenal on its own without financial support from the international community, including the United States of America. Kravchuk added that, under conditions when certain states are officially making territorial claims against Ukraine at the parliamentary level, Ukraine needs the nuclear states to provide us with reliable security guarantees in the form of a legally binding document.

The success of the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine also depends on the settlement of the issue of acceptable compensation for the nuclear material of the warheads, which will be dismantled.

The U.S. secretary of state expressed understanding of Ukraine's position, in particular, on the issue of guaranteeing its security, financial aid, and development of the process of negotiations in the future. Christopher said that the United States was ready to extend relations with Ukraine beyond the nuclear boundary and to focus the attention of bilateral relations on economic and other issues, since this was the very approach that was the most reliable guarantee of peace all over the world.

During the course of the conversation, subjects such as the progress of the work of the Ukrainian parliament on ratifying the START-I Treaty, the utilization of aid allocated by the United States of America to Ukraine, and Ukraine's guarantees within the framework of European security systems were also raised.

Urges Discussion of START I

*LD2510213093 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 25 Oct 93*

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State (Warren Christopher) [words indistinct] journalists [words indistinct] have raised the level of aid to Ukraine to \$330 million. It is intended for the development of a sector of the economy and disarmament. Warren Christopher pointed out that this is the minimum commitment. The United States will grant greater aid once Ukraine has begun taking major steps in the direction of reforms.

The secretary of state pointed out that Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and the leadership of the Supreme Council today confirmed that they aspire to make Ukraine a non-nuclear state. Senior parliamentarians stated, in Christopher's words, that in November they are to discuss the ratification of the START I Treaty and accession to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

Ukrainian Party Leader Refutes U.S. Position

*LD2510181693 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 25 Oct 93*

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's position is known: It is to seek the quickest possible surrender of nuclear weapons by Ukraine. This was stated in an interview by Mykhaylo Horyn, chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party [URP], who commented on the high-ranking American guest's visit to Ukraine.

Mykhaylo Horyn emphasized that U.S. pressure has recently eased on this issue of principle. The URP is of the opinion, Mykhaylo Horyn stated, that Ukraine ought to keep part of its nuclear potential as a guarantee of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. He pointed out that Ukraine could dismantle the liquid-fuel missiles while keeping the 46 solid-fuel missiles until all the countries begin to disarm simultaneously and all together.

Press Conference 25 October in Kiev

*LD2610212293 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 26 Oct 93*

[Report on a news conference held by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Kiev on 25 October]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted summarizing Christopher visit; passage ends noting that a question was asked at a joint news conference addressed to Foreign Affairs Minister Anatoliy Zlenko regarding the nuclear issue: the question itself is not specified]

[Begin Zlenko recording] I would like to say that it is impossible to talk about the Supreme Council delaying the consideration of this issue. I would like to say that, on the contrary, the Supreme Council is studying every aspect of the forthcoming possible ratification of the START I Treaty very minutely indeed.

One can understand what are the consequences that arise for Ukraine after ratification. Today perhaps, it is about the implementation, rather than the ratification, of the START I. As far as our members of parliament, the Supreme Council, are concerned and our people in general, two issues arise, which are most important: The first issue is [word indistinct] be given appropriate guarantees of our national security in view of the evident instability around Ukraine and the second issue is providing us with appropriate financial and technological assistance. There is a directly proportional connection between ratification, settlement of the issue of provision of Ukraine with guarantees and financial aid, and specific implementation of START I. The sooner the settlement of the issue of provision of guarantees and financial aid is sped up, the sooner the implementation of the obligations, assumed by Ukraine, will begin. I have come to realize clearly that the American delegation, particularly the secretary of state, and we achieved understanding on these very issues. It would be desirable if the implementation of the accords we reached today could be stepped up.

Russian Report on Talks in Ukraine

*LD2610201293 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1741 GMT 26 Oct 93*

[Text] The framework agreement signed in Kiev by the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko and the American Secretary of State Warren Christopher is a general document which defines the principles of destroying nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory. The statement was made at a Tuesday news conference by the head of the information department of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Yuriy Sergeyev. He stressed that the agreement does not specify the types of missiles, nuclear fuel or the time of their withdrawal from Ukrainian territory.

In this context Sergeyev said other agreements might be signed defining individual provisions of the agreement. He said on Tuesday Ukrainian and American delegations continued negotiations on its implementation.

The agreement will come into force when diplomatic notes confirming the performance of all the necessary procedures are exchanged. Sergeyev did not rule out the possibility that the agreement will have to be ratified by the Ukrainian parliament. The agreement will remain valid for seven years.

IZVESTIYA Hails Breakthrough

*PM2610124793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Oct 93 First Edition p 1*

[Viktor Litovkin commentary: "The First Two Nuclear Warheads Have Been Moved From Ukrainian Territory to Russia. Defective Ones"]

[Text] At the end of the week a special train carrying two strategic missile nuclear warheads left Buyan station

near Kiev bound for Russian territory. It is now traveling along the Gorkiy railroad toward the plant where the warheads will be dismantled and inspected to discover the cause of the faults in them.

The fact is that defects emerged in these warheads during the process of maintaining them, the specialists claim, and there was a change in the gas environment inside the warhead body, a fact immediately signaled by the automatic mechanism. The condition of the warheads was deemed pre-accident. Eliminating the fault on the spot proved impossible so the warheads had to be sent back to the manufacturing enterprise.

But after the warheads were taken from covered storage, loaded into a special freight car, and prepared for transport, unexpected complications developed. The Ukrainian customs service demanded that the documents authorizing export be completed again on the grounds that it did not have any confirmation that the agreement between the two countries on Russian compensation to Ukraine for the value of the fissionable materials contained in the warheads applies to these nuclear munitions.

For more than two weeks—from 5 through 22 October—the train containing the nuclear munitions stood in the siding at the station while correspondence was exchanged between functionaries of the two governments. The Russian side claimed that no additional documents were necessary because the terms of the transfer of the nuclear warheads from one state to another are stipulated not only by the accord of September 1993 but also by the intergovernmental documents of April 1992, which clearly state that the export of such materials is to be carried out without hindrance and is not subject to customs inspection. In Russia it was stressed that holding up freight cars with a load like this, especially a defective one which is not contained within a special concrete storage facility, is a very risky matter and could have dire consequences. The Ukrainian side, however, insisted that each such event requires a special decision without which export cannot take place.

Be that as it may, the train has now left. The 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads stationed in Ukraine have now been reduced by exactly two. Experts independent of the Russian Defense Ministry with whom I have spoken pointed out that this was helped not just by the goodwill of leaders of the Ukrainian customs and the Center for the Management of Strategic Nuclear Weapons but also by the preparation for U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's visit to Kiev. A political scandal over the two defective warheads just before talks with Christopher, especially talks on the problem of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament, could complicate relations between the two states.

On the other hand, they assert, the political advantages from a delay with the transshipment of such a specific load could play into Russia's hands because it cannot be

ruled out that Russia wanted to show the eminent visitor its southern neighbor's intractability on these problems.

Incidentally, those nuclear warheads which were at the center of an emergency at the Pervomayskiy base in Nikolayevsk Oblast in mid-September (see *IZVESTIYA* issue no. 175) have still not been sent back to the manufacturing plant.

Trip Unsuccessful, Says IZVESTIYA

*PM2710101593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Oct 93 First Edition pp 1, 3*

[Aleksandr Sychev report: "Christopher's Mission to Kiev Unsuccessful. Ukraine Prepared To Give Up Nuclear Weapons Only in Exchange for \$3 Billion"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher went to Kiev to secure at long last Ukraine's agreement to get rid of the nuclear weapons remaining on its territory. But almost a year of vigorous Washington diplomacy in Kiev proved unsuccessful. Moreover, the Ukrainian position clearly changed for the worse.

Only recently Kiev was offering assurances that the pledges on nuclear disarmament would be approved by parliament at any moment. Only the most nationalist politicians in parliament, who seemingly did not reflect the opinion of the majority, were speaking of financial compensation and special security guarantees.

But now Secretary of State Christopher faced outright haggling. He was given to understand that success on the question of nuclear weapons in Ukraine will cost Washington at least \$2.8 billion, and maybe \$5 billion, as parliament Chairman Ivan Plyushch stated. "The more swiftly the problem of guarantees and financial aid is resolved, the more swiftly Ukraine will fulfill its pledges," Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko said.

An agreement whereby Washington will provide Ukraine with the \$175 million promised earlier for the dismantling of warheads plus another \$155 million as financial aid for the restoration of the economy was signed in Kiev.

The only response to this goodwill gesture that Christopher heard from President Leonid Kravchuk was: "Let parliament decide." Today the majority of the Ukrainian Supreme Council is effectively opposed to a nuclear-free status for the state. Christopher was promised that parliament might ratify the START I treaty by the end of the year, but with substantial amendments.

Ukraine is insisting that it be regarded as a nuclear state and be included in the negotiating process on nuclear arms on an equal footing with the five recognized nuclear powers. In exchange for the aforesaid amount of compensation and on condition that Russia returns the nuclear fuel for nuclear power stations recovered from the warheads, deputies are prepared to allow only 130 old SS-19 ICBM's whose lifetime is coming to an end to go "under the knife." As for the 46 modern SS-24

missiles and also the 40 strategic bombers equipped with nuclear weapons, it is proposed to leave them "temporarily" in Ukraine's arsenal. According to Dmitro Pavlychko, chairman of the Supreme Council Foreign Policy Committee, this could go on for "seven, 10, or 20 years."

The motives of the advocates of a "temporarily" nuclear Ukraine are perfectly obvious. Some see nuclear weapons as offering an opportunity to satisfy great-power ambitions, others would merely like to sell the weapons at the highest possible price regardless of the consequences.

As early as 1995 the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons might not be extended, and up to a dozen new nuclear powers threatening one another with force would emerge in the world. Nuclear tests would be continued. The fulfillment of the START I and START II treaties would also be wrecked.

The weapons on Ukraine's territory are included in the overall quotas for the cuts. If the Ukrainian SS-24's and bombers are excluded from the process even temporarily, then Russia, in order to comply with the timetable, will have to destroy its own, more modern systems. Naturally Moscow will not agree to this.

Kiev risks finding itself in political isolation. The annoyed U.S. secretary of state hinted at the possibility of such a development before leaving for the next destination on his itinerary—Belarus. "The retention of nuclear weapons will weaken your security, not strengthen it," he said. "It will hamper and maybe jeopardize the process of integration in the world community of democratic nations, which is the only real guarantee of Ukraine's security."

Scientist Suggests CIS Space Cooperation

*AU3108101593 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY
in Ukrainian 27 Aug 93 p 1*

[Interview with Anatoliy Zavalysyn, head of department for space programs and expert analyses at Ukraine's National Space Agency subordinated to the Cabinet of Ministers, by Volodymyr Oliynyk; place and date not given: "We Need a Tripartite Agreement With Russia and Kazakhstan"—first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] Anatoliy Pavlovych Zavalysyn served at the Baykonur space-vehicle launching site for 33 years. His last post there was deputy chief in charge of research and tests at the space-vehicle launching site. He is one of the few specialists of the former Union who has a clear knowledge of how much Ukraine needs the space-vehicle launching site.

Oliynyk: To what extent does the assertion to the effect that Ukraine is a great space power correspond to reality?

Zavalysyn: That Ukraine is a great space power is undeniable. It is a different matter that this space power, as also a number of other space powers, lacks a complete and closed technological cycle for manufacturing, preparing, and receiving space-related services.

Oliynyk: It is dangerous?

Zavalysyn: No, because, without having our own space-vehicle launching site, we can lease a launch area in some other place. That is to say, if there is something we do not have, we have to buy it from somebody else. This is the case with all European space powers, but not with the United States. The former Soviet Union also had a closed cycle of space technology, but even then certain parts, instruments, and even whole space systems were only developed in Ukraine. They continue to be developed in Ukraine now, because it is not so simple to find an analogue. Even if Russia does everything to replace Ukraine's products, to return, for example, to the level of 1991, Russia may need between 5 and 7 years to catch up with Ukraine's level of manufacturing these systems. In other words, if Russia invests corresponding capital, it will need much time, even with its capacities, to become fully autonomous and independent of Ukraine. Relative to Russia, we have, roughly speaking, one in seven large design bureaus in the sphere of space exploration.

Oliynyk: What is the research potential of our design bureau?

Zavalysyn: In terms of its research potential and production base it constitutes approximately 17-20 percent of the Russian potential.

Oliynyk: Let us return to the problem of Baykonur. It is quite painful.

Zavalysyn: I believe that it is a problem of all CIS states. Having seized the property that remained from the Union and having nationalized that property, many state leaders have no idea of what they have done, in the final analysis. Having appropriated such a complex as Baykonur, Kazakhstan cannot maintain it. It is simply dead equipment on its land. That is why I welcome the fact that [Kazakhstan's] President Nazarbayev finally realized that Ukraine and Russia also need to be on the territory of the space-vehicle launching site, because Kazakhstan alone will never be able to manage it.

A permanent agreement on utilizing Baykonur by Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan is necessary. Russia and Ukraine must participate in this because there are launching complexes for their missiles and sites for preparing space vehicles; and Kazakhstan—because the space-vehicle launching site is on its territory.

Oliynyk: Can Ukraine afford such a "luxury" as Baykonur?

Zavalysyn: I think that Baykonur is not a luxury. It is a place where, by launching a space vehicle, one can obtain space services not only in the interests of the national economy or science, but also for defense purposes. It is

impossible for Ukraine, which is densely populated and has a small area, to have its own space-vehicle launching sites. We can have neither land-based launchers nor sea-based ones. From this point of view, Ukraine may have so-called aerospace take-off points where the mother aircraft is the initial stage. We are studying this possibility and will proceed along this road. However, before we create our own mother aircraft that would be able to take off from our airfields, we should not waste time. At best, we will manage to do this by the year 2000.

We definitely are a space power, and we need to derive profit from using space and we need remote control probing of Ukraine's territory—this is very important. To have our own communications and not beg from others, because, at any moment, they can cut off our communications network—both governmental and presidential. Both regular communications and special. That is why we need to unite with Kazakhstan and Russia on this point and create some organization. In any case, it must be an international organization where we could share expenses and could derive profit in proportion to how much each of us invests and what we do.

Oliynyk: Will not such a union become a step toward renewing the empire?

Zavalysyn: No, we are not talking of uniting three states as political structures. It is a matter of creating an organization that would unite all those interested in using the space-vehicle launching site and that would admit members on various terms.

Oliynyk: Incidentally, how is your contribution as a specialist assessed in Ukraine?

Zavalysyn: I receive a pension, just like all officers of the former Soviet Union who did not serve in Ukraine and did not finish their service in Ukraine. Incidentally, I would like to say something about those people who have remained in Baykonur after I left. Who do not know, to this day, whose nationals they are. Ukraine does not want those servicemen. Russia forces them to adopt the citizenship of Kazakhstan, and so forth. It is absolutely necessary to give this a thought, because there are many Ukrainians among those servicemen. Incidentally, last year we appealed to Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to General Martirosyan, but everything still remains at the stage of words. Even though we have already prepared an agreement on the status of our people.

Many intelligent people are presently leaving Baykonur, because they do not only see a future there, but also normal life.

Oliynyk: If it gives rise so many problems, maybe it is worthwhile giving up Baykonur?

Zavalysyn: Without space research, in 5 years' time, we will lag behind others, so that even in 15 years, we will not be able to catch up with the 20 space powers. All

world states utilize space technologies, which they purchase from the said 20 space powers. We must implement our space technology at home, even though we still have no dollars to do this and no legislation on space research. This legislation does not only specify the sequence of actions, but also benefits. Ukraine does not have this, although this should have been introduced long ago.

Second. The National Space Agency is an organization that has no industry of its own; the Ministry of Conversion is in charge of industry. That ministry has no time to deal with supporting Ukraine's space-missile potential.

Ukraine Accused of Foot Dragging Over Missiles

PM2110155593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Oct 93 p 1

[Statement by Major General Vitaliy Yakovlev, deputy chief of staff of the Russian Defense Ministry Main Directorate, in reply to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA question: "The Train is Still in the Siding: Ukraine is Blocking the Departure of Nuclear Munitions in Pre-Accident Condition"]

[Text] As is well known, Russia and Ukraine have reached agreement on the transfer of nuclear munitions to the territory of the Russian Federation where they will be dismantled. But the fulfillment of this accord is being constantly complicated for purely formal reasons. What is the situation today?

Maj. Gen. Vitaliy Yakovlev, deputy chief of staff of a Russian Defense Ministry Main Directorate, now answers that question for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA:

I think that our partners are simply forgetting what kind of weapons these are and how they should be handled. We have received a telegram in which they propose renegotiating with the Russian Government the transfer of the defective nuclear warheads to Russian territory. Even though back on 3 September an intergovernmental agreement was signed on transferring strategic nuclear munitions to Russian territory with subsequent compensation to Ukraine for the fissionable materials that they contain. But that agreement is being disregarded.

What is the reason for the particular attention that is being paid to these nuclear warheads? At some stage in the past they were scrapped. There was a fault in their automatic mechanism. We are talking about munitions in a faulty condition which could be characterized as a pre-accident condition. They were loaded into a freight car and are now uncovered and outside normal storage conditions, so to speak. These two munitions were destined to be transferred to Russian industrial enterprises where they would be dismantled and the causes of the defect diagnosed. That they are defective is indicated by a change in the gas environment within the container [vnutri obyema]. But this is not without danger to service personnel. Despite all this the departure of the train has

been held up now since 5 October for purely formal reasons even though back on 8 September Ukraine confirmed its acceptance of the terms of the nuclear materials shipments.

What are the Ukrainian side's complaints? We have been informed that formally these are customs complaints. The documents have not been properly completed, it seems. But what have documents to do with it when all the terms for the transfer of the nuclear munitions were stipulated in a government-level agreement back in April 1992. Under that agreement the transfer of the nuclear munitions across the border is to be effected without hindrance by either side. And they are not to be subject to customs inspection. This is a clear case of foot-dragging over the departure of the train and essentially another attempt to jeopardize the implementation of the agreement reached in Crimea. It turns out that the Ukrainian side is simply trying to extract some political advantage from this. But the most interesting thing is that to a certain extent this also undermines Ukraine's prestige in the eyes of the international community.

What dangers are there in this situation? First, the system of ensuring the safety of the munitions is violated. The most vulnerable area here today is in transport. When ammunition is transferred from a protected storage facility to a means of transport it naturally becomes more vulnerable to the influence of various factors. And second, it must be borne in mind that these are defective munitions. They need special handling. The longer Ukraine drags its feet the greater the risk that they will require extra work. This is because munitions with deviations and alterations in the environment within the container are dismantled not according to the regulation method but in a special way devised by the chief designer and carried out in exceptionally rigorous conditions.

In my view, such an attitude in general is criminal. Not to mention the attitude toward the people who have been on board the train in a state of complete uncertainty since 5 October and what is more have been left to fend for themselves.

International Monitors To Supervise Weapons Destruction

LD2909094493 Kiev UNIA in Ukrainian 2140 GMT
28 Sep 93

["The Defense Ministry press service reports"—UNIA headline]

[Text] Kiev, 28 Sep—According to the Ukrainian Defense Ministry press service, an inspection group from Germany's Ministry of Defense has arrived in Ukraine at the invitation of the Ministry of Defense, which in accordance with the Conventional Arms Reduction Treaty, will familiarize itself with the course of the treaty's implementation by the Ukrainian side. This is already the 23d inspection which is being carried out in our state this year.

The group is headed by Paul Khuze [name as received] and will be in Zhitomir and Ovruch. It is planned to destroy 35 combat armored vehicles at the tank repair plant in Zhitomir. Of these, 10 will be converted into general purpose tractors, the rest will be turned into scrap metal.

In Ovruch, out of 25 airplanes, 1 will become a ground training base [as received] and the others will be destroyed.

Vice Premier on Disputes With Russia Over Nuclear Weapons

LD2110215093 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2012 GMT 21 Oct 93

[Text] Ukraine's Vice Premier [deputy prime minister] Valeriy Shmarov, in charge of the military-industrial complex, regrets that the question of ownership of the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine remains unsettled and blames all problems in relations with Russia on this issue.

In an interview with Interfax on Thursday, he reiterated Ukraine's right to possess the nuclear weapons on its territory. However, the nuclear arms have, in fact, begun to be moved into Russia, he said.

He recalled the times when battlefield nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the republic without any question of compensation, yet this weaponry might have made tons of low-enriched uranium for Ukrainian nuclear power plants. The picture for Ukraine, currently in the throws of an energy crisis, would not have been as bleak as it looks today, he pointed out.

On the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's position, Shmarov remarked that the military does not want the warheads to disappear from the republic without a trace.

However, he gave the assurance that Ukraine is ready to ship to Russia obsolete or nearly outdated weapons. In this connection, he had sent a cable to Russia's Nuclear Power Engineering Minister Victor Mikhailov, asking him to confirm whether these warheads would be taken into account in the agreements signed in Massandra, and whether Ukraine could count on uranium supplies for its nuclear power stations in return.

On the position taken by Russia and the U.S., insisting on the immediate removal of nuclear warheads from Ukraine, Shmarov noted that once this problem was solved, "we would confront the most difficult and costly task of dismantling the silos and delivery vehicles."

He is convinced that "after the warheads withdrawal, no one will discuss how to utilize missiles with us," for this reason, Ukraine urges discussing these issues in a single package. Ukrainian experts claim that it will cost \$1.5-2 Bn to scrap missiles. The U.S. is ready to provide only \$175 Mn.

In Shmarov's words, economic problems can make it difficult for Ukraine to implement START-I, which parliament could ratify already this year. The issues are

to be examined with U.S. secretary of State Warren Christopher when he visits Ukraine on October 24-26.

Zlenko on Nuclear Issue at 25 October News Conference

LD2610212293 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 26 Oct 93

[Report on a news conference held by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Kiev on 25 October]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted summarizing Christopher visit; passage ends noting that a question was asked at a joint news conference addressed to Foreign Affairs Minister Anatoliy Zlenko regarding the nuclear issue: the question itself is not specified]

[Begin Zlenko recording] I would like to say that it is impossible to talk about the Supreme Council delaying the consideration of this issue. I would like to say that, on the contrary, the Supreme Council is studying every aspect of the forthcoming possible ratification of the START I Treaty very minutely indeed.

One can understand what are the consequences that arise for Ukraine after ratification. Today perhaps, it is about the implementation, rather than the ratification, of the START I. As far as our members of parliament, the Supreme Council, are concerned and our people in general, two issues arise, which are most important: The first issue is [word indistinct] be given appropriate guarantees of our national security in view of the evident instability around Ukraine and the second issue is providing us with appropriate financial and technological assistance. There is a directly proportional connection between ratification, settlement of the issue of provision of Ukraine with guarantees and financial aid, and specific implementation of START I. The sooner the settlement of the issue of: provision of guarantees and financial aid is sped up, the sooner the implementation of the obligations, assumed by Ukraine, will begin. I have come to realize clearly that the American delegation, particularly the secretary of state, and we achieved understanding on these very issues. It would be desirable if the implementation of the accords we reached today could be stepped up.

More on Nonproliferation Center Established in Ukraine

WS2610154693 Kiev Ukrainske Radio First Program
Network in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 26 Oct 93

[Text] Representatives of the Canadian, Swedish, Ukrainian, and U.S. governments signed in Kiev an agreement on establishing a scientific and technological center, NTTSL, whose purpose is to give the Ukrainian engineers and specialists employed in the military industry an opportunity to apply their knowledge and capabilities in civilian branches of the economy, thus reducing the threat [words indistinct] of nuclear weapons. All sides that signed the agreement committed themselves to allocating substantial

funds to finance the center's projects. The United States of America is to earmark \$10 million, Canada \$2 million, and Sweden \$1.5 million. Ukraine will be responsible for ensuring tax-exempt premises, equipment, services, and safety guarantees for the center. Proposals for the projects can be submitted by private individuals, organizations, or governments. They can be forwarded directly to governments of the countries that signed the agreement. The NTTsU will finance projects promoting the resolution of national or international technological problems, supporting Ukraine's transition to the market economy and its basis, and applied research as well as encouraging technological development in the spheres of environmental protection, energy, nuclear security, and elimination of consequences of accidents at nuclear reactors. To implement the center's projects, its Board of Directors is planning to engage government and nongovernment organizations and private entrepreneurs from different countries.

Official Warns Against Outside Pressure To Implement NPT

LD2010192093 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Report by Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Commission on the ratification of the START I Treaty and accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet evening session on 20 October —recorded]

[Text] National security has many supports. But its main foundation is its own armed force, capable of checking an aggressor.

Excluding from the arsenal of its foreign policy the threat of (?using) nuclear weapons, I quote (?our) document, Ukraine as an owner of these weapons should deal with them wisely. We should ratify START I, but at the same time it is not necessary or even harmful to extend the framework of this treaty. Talk may be about destroying (?30) percent of nuclear weapons located in Ukraine, and not more.

The accession of Ukraine to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] is possible only after, first, the world community reinterprets this document, which is discriminatory regarding our state, in 1995, and second, an agreement is signed between Ukraine and nuclear states, a legally binding act that nuclear states will not allow a change to the current Ukrainian borders. We are going toward non-nuclear status, but no one, apart from us, can decide how long this road will be. We are owners of weapons today, and we should not give in to any pressure directed at disarming us as soon as possible and against our own interests.

Supreme Council Debates National Security

LD2010201293 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1530 GMT 20 Oct 93

[Text] Kiev, 20 Oct—At the afternoon session of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, deputies completed discussion of Ukraine's national security. Reports were delivered by Oleksandr Yakymenko, chairman of the

Supreme Court of Ukraine (on certain issues of exercising legislation by courts which guarantees Ukraine's national security), by Environment Minister Yuriy Kostenko (ecological security as part and parcel of the national security of Ukraine), and by Mykola Shpeynberh, chairman of the State Committee of Ukraine for Nuclear Radiation Safety, (on measures to guarantee safety of nuclear facilities in Ukraine).

The measures proposed by Mr. Shpeynberh include approval of the draft resolution "On Certain Measures to Supply the National Economy With Electricity." In particular, the draft envisions that the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution of 2 August 1990 on a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear power stations on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR be lifted. Mr. Shpeynberh [name as received] also proposes to agree to the proposal of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers to continue operating the Chernobyl AES within the period of time determined by its technical state.

Kravchuk News Conference on Fate of Missiles

LD1910211493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1928 GMT 19 Oct 93

[Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk declared Kiev's readiness to reduce 130 nuclear missiles stationed on the Ukrainian territory after ratification of START-I Treaty.

In his interview with journalists on Tuesday he also noted that Kiev is ready to make a compromise with respect to the fate of 46 SS-24 missiles which means taking them off alert.

The president made it clear that at present Ukraine is able to re-target nuclear missiles stationed on its territory.

Vice Premier Valeriy Shmarov, in charge of the republic's military-industrial complex, who participated in the conversation pointed out that an opportunity of retargeting can be viewed only theoretically. In his words, it would be problematic for Ukraine to command its nuclear weapons without its northern neighbor (Russia—Interfax).

Deputy Foreign Minister Sees No Resolution to Nuclear Impasse

BR1810154993 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 15 Oct 93 p 4

[Report on interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, by Bert Lanting, in Amsterdam: date not given: "Black Sea Fleet Remains Bone of Contention—Ukrainian Politician Sees No Solution Ahead"]

[Text] For the last year and a half Russia and the Ukraine have been arguing about the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union and the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the bases of which are in Ukraine. However, the end is not yet in sight, as was shown in an interview with the main negotiator on the Ukrainian side, Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, who was in the Netherlands for a brief visit.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet and the nuclear legacy of the Soviet Union is far from over. The agreement in principle reached by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk last month would probably not be presented to the Ukrainian Parliament, according to Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk.

The two former Soviet republics have been squabbling over the military assets of the former Soviet Union for more than one and a half years now. Early last month they seemed to have suddenly made a breakthrough. During a summit meeting in Massandra, on the Krim peninsula, Yeltsin and Kravchuk reached agreement in principle on a solution, under which Ukraine would sell half of the Black Sea Fleet to Russia. Also, the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory would be transferred to Russia—for financial compensation.

But that was a misunderstanding, according to Deputy Minister Tarasyuk, responsible for the negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet and the nuclear weapons. "The world's media have given an excessively positive image of the Massandra summit," he said. "The impression was given that the matter was settled. However, that is not the case. No agreement was made on the Black Sea Fleet and the nuclear weapons."

The international press had the wool pulled over its eyes by the Russian delegation, Tarasyuk said. "They wanted to pretend that there had been a breakthrough," he said. "Perhaps it was wishful thinking. But in any event it was a misleading image."

He strongly denied that there was an agreement, and also that President Kravchuk had executed a speedy turnaround after the results of the Russian-Ukrainian summit were strongly criticized in the Ukrainian Parliament. "Kravchuk did not do a turnaround," Tarasyuk said. "When he returned to Kiev, right from the start he said that the sale of half the fleet to Russia was only a suggestion, no more than one of the ideas which would have to be examined."

Tarasyuk did not exclude the possibility that ultimately Kiev would be ready to "sell" its share of the 380 ships in the Black Sea Fleet to Russia, but first agreement would have to be reached on compensation and a formula found for the rental of the naval facilities in Sebastopol on the Krim peninsula.

As for the nuclear legacy of the Soviet Union, it seemed at one point that a breakthrough really would be made in Massandra, the Ukrainian politician said. However, at the last minute the negotiations got blocked, because Russia refused to pay compensation for the approximately 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons which Ukraine has already handed over, although the presidents of the two countries had a spoken agreement to that effect, Tarasyuk said.

"It is always the same problem," he said. "They deny us our due. Whether it is the assets of the former Soviet Union, the currency reserves, or the real estate of the former Soviet Union at home and abroad, they simply do not want to give

us our rightful share." As long as no agreement has been reached on payment for the tactical nuclear weapons, then the Ukrainian Government will not present the agreements on the nuclear weapons to parliament.

There are currently 176 intercontinental nuclear missiles on Ukrainian territory, namely 130 SS-19's and 46 SS-24's, with 1,240 nuclear warheads. In addition there are approximately 40 strategic bombers with around 500 nuclear warheads.

Since the Soviet Union fell apart at the end of 1991, Ukraine has repeatedly emphasized that it did not want to become a nuclear power, and therefore was prepared to give up the nuclear weapons. That still held true, Tarasyuk said. President Kravchuk and the government were in favor of signing both the Nonproliferation Treaty—which is intended to stop the spread of nuclear weapons—and the START-I treaty, under which some of the nuclear missiles stationed in Ukraine must also be removed.

However, the question is far more sensitive in the Ukrainian Parliament. There is considerable opposition to giving up the nuclear weapons, through which the country would lose superpower status in one blow.

Tarasyuk hoped that the Ukrainian Parliament would restart examining the START-I treaty next month, after a suspension some months ago. But it was open to question whether it would be approved, because first a settlement would have to be made with Russia on the compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons, Tarasyuk emphasized. In addition Kiev is demanding billions of guilders in aid for the dismantling of the nuclear weapons, and security guarantees from the permanent members of the Security Council. Ukraine wanted guarantees in the event of a military attack, and guarantees that it would not be a victim of economic pressure, Tarasyuk said. These seem to be very extensive demands. Should the Big Five intervene militarily if Ukraine were to be attacked? "No, we are realistic," Tarasyuk said. "We too know that even solid guarantees often mean little once a military conflict has broken out. What it is about for us is to prevent such a conflict breaking out."

He accused Russia of trying to put his country under pressure by opposing maintenance activities for the nuclear weapons. Last month the Russian press reported increased radioactivity in a nuclear warhead storage area on the Pervomaysk [as published] base. Tarasyuk admitted that there were problems, although they were "not serious," he said. "We have proposed moving the nuclear warheads to other storage places," he said. "But the Russians do not want to. In this way they are trying to create artificial problems and put us under pressure."

Tarasyuk consoled himself with the thought that the power struggle in Moscow did not turn out differently. "That would have been a disaster," Tarasyuk said. He pointed out that Rutskoy in particular had always insisted that the Krim and Sebastopol belonged to Russia. "If Rutskoy and Khasbulatov had won, a new cold war would have broken out," he said. "Only this time we would have stood on the other side of the trenches."

Poll Shows Kiev's Attitude to Nuclear Status, Russia

AU1510201493 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
14 Oct 93 p 4

[Article by Volodymyr Skachko: "To NATO—With Our Own Missiles?"]

[Text] It is, perhaps, that, like a person who, after he learns about other peoples' opinion of himself, must determine where he belongs, a state must occupy its position according to its own status and possibilities. Proceeding from the assumption that external policy is an extension of internal policy, the research and training center "Democratic Initiatives," jointly with the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Sociology Institute, decided to find out, on 2 and 3 October 1993, how Kievans picture Ukraine's geopolitical status. This is what they learned: 6 percent of respondents were in favor of the unconditional proclamation of Ukraine's nuclear status; 27 percent endorsed the keeping of the nuclear weapons until international security guarantees are granted; 33 percent favored the nuclear status with a simultaneous initiative to seek total elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world; 6 percent did not care one way or the other; and only 22 percent were categorically opposed to retaining nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

In each case, 30 percent of respondents expressed their support for mutually incompatible variants of Ukraine's fate—(1) joining NATO independently of other countries and (2) achieving nonaligned and neutral status. The idea of Ukraine's joining NATO together with other CIS countries was supported by 17 percent; 9 percent of respondents were in favor of joining the CIS military alliance as an alternative to NATO, and 14 percent proposed other variants.

The Massandra [in the Crimea] protocols signed by Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol did not receive support of 46 percent of the respondents; 24 percent approved of them; 15 percent were not even aware that those protocols existed at all; and 15 percent could not give any definite assessment.

Nor do Kievans forget the historical grudge. When asked whether Russia, which has proclaimed itself as the only successor to the USSR, must compensate for Ukraine's losses due to the genocide (the artificially created famine) in 1932-33, just like the FRG is doing by paying Israel compensation for the genocide of Jews during World War II, 52 percent of respondents answered in the affirmative, 29 percent objected, and 6 percent stated that the problem did not concern them.

However, the demand for compensation from Russia does not mean that Russia no longer plays a certain spiritual role in the life of Kievans. Asked "Which television programs do

you prefer for getting information on politics?" 42 percent opted for the Russian and Central State Television, 26 percent said that they prefer the Ukrainian State Television, yet another 23 percent receive information on politics from local television channels not owned by the state, while 14 percent are not interested in politics at all. By comparison with a similar poll on the printed mass media in June, the situation has not changed—Russian mass media prevail in the information area of Kiev.

In my opinion, the only shortcoming of this poll is the number of respondents: 400 Kievans altogether. However, they represented all social, age, professional, and educational-level strata of the population. In short, the poll could be broader, but something else could be done: Our own position could be determined on the basis of the questions [samovyznachytysya iz zaproponovanykh pytan]. Maybe, some day, somebody will ask....

Foreign Minister Says U.S. Aid Linked To START I Ratification

LD1210180593 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1319 GMT
12 Oct 93

[Text] Kiev [no dateline as received]—Ukraine's Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko told journalists at a news conference on 12 October that his recent visit to the United States convinced him of the United States' positive attitude to Ukraine. The Ukrainian minister was pleased with the results of his meeting with U.S. President William Clinton. The U.S. Congress ruled to grant Ukraine financial aid in the amount of at least \$300 million dollars. "These funds will be given interest-free," Anatoliy Zlenko specified. "The president of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers are currently examining the framework agreement which determined U.S. financial aid. The money needs to be distributed to different areas as soon as possible."

Ukraine's foreign minister also confirmed a direct dependence between the ratification of the START I Treaty by the Ukrainian parliament and the amount of Western financial aid Ukraine can count on.

Iran To Buy Chemicals From Sumy Oblast

LD1110090093 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0715 GMT
11 Oct 93

[Text] Sumy, 1 Oct—A delegation of Iranian businessmen arrived in the city to sign a cooperation agreement with the Khimprom [Chemical Industry] production association. The products of the association attracted the Iranians' attention at an exhibition sale held in the city of Tabriz (the Islamic Republic of Iran). The Iranians are willing to buy sodium sulphite, red and yellow coloring agents, and titanium dioxide. [passage indistinct]

AUSTRIA

Vienna Gives 400 Million Schillings Per Year to ESA

AU1410104993 Vienna *DIE PRESSE* in German
14 Oct 93 p 14

[“g.h.”-signed report: “Space Flight Made in Austria”]

[Text] Vienna—Austria contributes 400 million schillings each year to the European Space Agency (ESA), thus enabling Austrian industry to participate in important space projects. “Since we joined ESA in 1987, Austrian industry has processed orders for more than 2 billion schillings,” Economics Chamber President Leopold Maderthaner stressed in Vienna yesterday, and praised “space as an economic factor”—approximately 800 billion schillings go to space industry each year all over the world—as a spearhead of technical development.

Austrian astronaut Franz Viehboeck pointed out that Austria will become a member of the Eumetsat organization this year, which commercially operates the satellites developed by ESA.

Austria's space industry is comprised of 500 highly qualified employees. A total of 25 companies are involved in materials technology and unit processing, software development, and satellite-based communication.

FRANCE

Government Welcomes U.S. Initiative on Weapons Proliferation

BR2909122493 Paris *LE QUOTIDIEN* in French
29 Sep 93 p 16

[Unattributed article: “Nuclear Power: France on the Same Wavelength as Washington”]

[Text] France said yesterday that it welcomed President Bill Clinton's proposals for the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while reserving for itself the right to examine the implications, for its own interests, of a ban on fissile materials. The American president had indicated on Monday before the UN General Assembly that his country would propose a treaty that would forever ban the production of fissile materials for military purposes and would pronounce itself in favor of a moratorium on nuclear testing. On this last point, France also was inclined “favorably toward a treaty” completely banning nuclear tests, “on the condition that it be universal and verifiable.”

NETHERLANDS

Journal on International Space Industry

BR2109130093 Rotterdam *NRC HANDELSBLAD*
in Dutch 13 Aug 93 pp 11-12

[Article by Ferry Versteeg: “Saturation Endangers Space Market”]

[Text] Despite rosy predictions, the growth of commercial space travel is proving disappointing. Faster technological improvements are resulting in constantly more powerful satellites which last for longer. And that is hurting the market. Most important of all is that the Russians, Chinese, and Japanese now carry out their own launchings. Can the Europeans with Arianespace maintain their current favorable position?

The glorious blue skies which once attracted large numbers of aerospace companies toward the commercial space sector are now clouding over. As a result of spectacular technological improvements and the arrival of new players on the field—Japan, China, and in particular Russia—saturation and overcapacity are threatening the market. To put it more simply: Too many bidders and launchers are chasing too few customers and payloads. This has changed the rocket and satellite high-technology construction industry, until recently accustomed to few market participants and great security, into a high-risk industry with prospects that are often uncertain.

It is becoming clearer every day that high-speed technical progress does not necessarily lead to commercial advantages. Because the launchers are becoming more accurate while satellites are becoming constantly more sophisticated, their in-orbit lifetimes are longer. Whereas halfway through the 1980's the life expectancy of the average “artificial moon” was 10 years, it is now already 15 years. They therefore need to be replaced less often. Above all, modern rockets are able to carry more tonnage into space in one go, and that damages the market.

Then there is the fact that the commercial space market mainly involves telecommunications, where improvements are particularly noticeable. This means that new satellites with constantly smaller-size on-board electronics are constantly being provided with greater transmission power. As a result, the present generation of satellites can cope with more telephone calls, faxes, and data transmission than is really needed. In addition, telephone companies are increasingly interested in fiber-optic sea-bed cables, which makes it clear that the commercial space sector is less booming than was forecast a decade ago.

However, it is still a large market worth some \$14 billion every year; a market which at the moment, it is true, is showing a moderate growth, but which in the latter part

of the 1990's, with the expected arrival of global, satellite-transmitted mobile telephone systems, will once again develop rapidly.

Curiously enough—as it was not planned in this way—the three powers mentioned above each dominate a particular part of commercial space traffic. In the satellite manufacturing sector, which was worth about \$2.5 billion last year, American companies sweep the floor with the rest of the world. Market leader Hughes Aircraft of Los Angeles still has the most to fear from fellow-American rivals such as Loral and General Electric. Together, the Americans supply three-quarters of the world's requirements for satellites. Their dominance becomes relative, however, in conjunction with their dependence on satellite components from Japan. European builders are well to the rear and have to make do with a small specialist market here and a solar panel there. That companies such as DASA [Deutsche Aerospace] from Germany, Aerospatiale and Matra from France, or GEC [General Electric Company] from Britain still exist as satellite manufacturers is primarily due to orders from their own governments for scientific space research and earth observation purposes. Even that was not enough for the satellite constructors at British Aerospace. Their department closed down not long ago because the parent company was unable to find a single interested purchaser.

Japanese companies dominate the lucrative ground equipment sector, which involves some \$6 billion annually. Mitsubishi Electric, NEC [Nippon Electronic Company], and Toshiba lead the field in this area, although they are also complaining about shrinking markets. "The increasing capacity of the ground equipment, coinciding with the fast development of satellite technology, means that our market cannot grow very quickly," so were the fears expressed by a spokesman from NEC, the world's leading manufacturer of space antennas.

As far as commercial rocket launching is concerned, the pace is set by Paris-based Arianespace—officially owned by some 50 European firms and five European governments, but in fact dominated by the French. Out of the total of 43 commercial satellites which were launched in 1991-92, 22 went up with the Ariane-4 rockets from the Kourou launch site in French Guiana. By the late 1990's, the not always reliable Ariane-4 will gradually be replaced by the Ariane-5, up to now Arianespace's most potent commercial weapon, which can easily take a 7,000-kilo payload into distant orbit around the Earth. Last year Arianespace recorded a net profit of 50 million Dutch guilders on total revenues of 1.7 billion. "In the last 18 months we have been able to book 19 orders, about 55 percent of the world market, despite strengthening competition," assured spokesman Claude Sanchez of Arianespace. "These new contracts, many of which come from Asia, bring our order book up to a total of 40 satellites still to be launched. That implies \$3.5-billion in revenues and work for the next four years." The Ariane rockets have in particular their proven reliability to thank for their popularity; in the last few years fewer

than one in 10 launches suffered complications. This is something that customers are particularly sensitive for. Insurance companies are not too keen on covering such colossal risks, and failures can very quickly cost tens of millions [currency not specified].

That the Americans, with their acclaimed space experience in the government-military sector, saw themselves trumped by relative newcomers from Europe in the commercial space market, and now hold less than one-third of the launch market, is astonishing but on closer examination not difficult to explain. American companies such as General Dynamics (Atlas), Martin Marietta (Titan), and McDonnell Douglas (Delta), developed their rockets at the time to the requirements of the U.S. Government and the Pentagon, and these remain by far their largest customers. Operating in such a protected market obviously does not stimulate any tendency toward innovation. All the larger American rockets were developed before 1970, which frequently has led to expensive launch postponements or even failures.

When Washington, following NASA's Challenger shuttle disaster in 1986, all at once called off any further commercial satellite launches by shuttle and pushed them on to the private sector, it was not too difficult for Arianespace in Europe to leave far behind them the pampered American competition with its outdated, less reliable equipment. Martin Marietta in fact left the commercial space market last year because it appeared to be much more lucrative to send Titans up into space for the U.S. Air Force. But even the USAF has now called a halt to launches which use the Titan for an indefinite period following the explosion of a Titan-4 with an expensive military satellite on board at the Californian base of Vandenberg on 1 August last.

A joint attempt by all American rocket manufacturers to have Washington pay the development costs for a new commercial booster rocket via a National Launch System Program was rejected by Congress last year. Now the five leading American rocket builders are apparently aiming for a subsidized consolation prize. They have invited NASA to work with them on a modernization project so as to be able to win back some ground from the Europeans with Arianespace.

It is clear that both Europe and America, who between them control 90 percent of the commercial launching market, can expect strong competition. From the Japanese, for instance, who have already achieved several successful launches of their H-1 rocket and who are now putting the finishing touches to the H-2, which will be ready by next year and will be capable of taking a load of 4,000 kilos into distant orbit. Managers of the \$3-billion project are claiming, however, that no positive efforts will be made to sell the H-2 outside Japan. "The market is simply too small for yet another tenderer," said a spokesman for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, one of the project leaders. The fact remains that, with the arrival of

the new rocket, a good part of the Japanese market will no longer be available to European and American launchers.

The Chinese, whose Great Wall Industry has been offering the Long March rockets since 1990 as commercial satellite launchers, are showing themselves to be more expansionist. Their biggest asset is the price: only \$35 million per launch, about half of what is asked in the West. A disadvantage which cannot be ignored, however, is the fact that two of the three Long March rockets launched since 1991 exploded prematurely. As a result the unfortunate Great Wall Industry has received no orders this year but for 1994, according to the proud Chinese, another launch has been booked. What they do not say is that the customer is a consortium of three Chinese public companies chaired by the Chinese Assistant Minister for Telecommunications, Xie Gaojue.

The greatest threat to the West comes from Russia. Despite being ruled by chaos and lack of money, the still giant Russian space industry managed to send some 50 large rockets with variable payloads into the atmosphere last year. Not long ago, Lockheed, one of the United States' largest defense contractors, signed an agreement with the Russian Khrunichev Enterprise to sell its famous Proton rocket at an extremely competitive price on the world market. And last December the Russians signed their first commercial launch contract with the London-based Inmarsat telecommunications consortium. In 1995 an Inmarsat satellite will go up for a nominal, bargain price of \$36 million. However, Olof Lundberg, the consortium's managing director, admits that "the launching of the American-built satellite by the Russian Proton rocket will entail quite a few expensive additional costs and adaptations because of the differences in the two systems."

There is, for instance, the "chicken on a spit" problem. When Western satellites separate from their Western carrier rockets, they rotate around their axis so that all surfaces are exposed equally to solar radiation and other space elements. Satellites launched by the Proton do not rotate, so the Inmarsat satellite will have to be fitted on one side with extra heat-resistant shields. Furthermore, the average Western satellite has its own rocket engines which are used to maneuver the vehicle into its final position, while the Proton is fitted with a fourth stage which performs that task. There are many other system differences. "With all the adaptations, the prices for Western and Russian launches are in the end not so very different," claims Lundberg.

Still, Western suspicions about possible disturbances in the market from the giant Russian space industry remain strong. Although the Europeans are the dominant satellite launchers, it was the Americans who took the initiative this year to check the Russian "threat" to their commercial space industry. Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Peter Allgeier entered into an agreement last June with the Russians whereby the latter committed themselves to launch no more than two large commercial

satellites per year between now and the year 2000. Agreements concerning the launch of small, low Earth orbiting satellites will be discussed as each case arises.

Despite American invitations for Europe to take part in this agreement with the Russians, Arianespace and the European Space Agency (ESA) are scowling in the other direction. "Arianespace should absorb its part of the blow inflicted upon the West and not begrudge the Russians a reasonable share in the launch market," U.S. negotiator Allgeier said irritably. "But the Europeans are trying to combine such a Russian market entry with a European right to bid for U.S. Government orders, and are therefore blocking a wider agreement."

"Nonsense," replies spokesman Sanchez of Arianespace. "We are also advocating structured forms of competition to prevent market deterioration and to make sure that all parties get a fair share of the market, but Europe must remain alert because, as leader in the commercial launching market, it has the most to lose."

This concern of Arianespace's has not been simply plucked out of the air. The European consortium is threatened with missing the boat in the installation of vast satellite networks all around the Earth to provide global mobile telephone services. And these are just the megaprojects which will give new impetus to the rather sickly commercial space industry.

The U.S. companies Loral and TRW are developing plans in this direction, but the most advanced project is the \$3.5-billion "Iridium" mobile telephone project of Motorola, another U.S. company. In the late 1990's, this project will have 66 small satellites in low Earth orbit which will enable mobile phone network subscribers to reach every remote corner on Earth—from the North Pole to the Kalahari Desert, or from Tahiti to Mount Everest.

Financiers from all over the world reached an agreement at the beginning of this month for the financing of the first stage of Iridium, valued at \$800 million. In the meantime, Motorola has signed launching contracts with several U.S. companies such as Lockheed and Raytheon, with the Russian Khrunichev Enterprise, and—last week—with the Chinese Great Wall Industry. But market leader Arianespace has for the time being been left out of this American initiative.

TURKEY

Turkey, Russia Spar Over CFE Limitations

Ankara Issues Statement

TA2609185393 Ankara TRT Television Network
in Turkish 1700 GMT 26 Sep 93

[Text] The Foreign Ministry has stated that Russian President Boris Yeltsin's request to lift the various limitations stipulated by the Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty should be assessed with its aspects by NATO and all the signatories.

A statement issued by the Foreign Ministry on the issue notes that the message sent by Yeltsin to President Suleyman Demirel asking that certain limitations imposed on Russia by this agreement has been submitted to the other NATO member countries. The statement goes on to say that CFE, which went into effect with the approval of 29 countries last year, constitutes the foundation of the new security structure in the region stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, adding that the amendment of this agreement requires the approval of all the countries that are party to it.

The statement continues: It is necessary for all the signatories, including Russia, to fully abide by the limitations the CFE has introduced to the amount of arms that can be deployed to the west of Urals with the aim of ensuring a lasting security and stability in Europe if the system is to be effective and the renewal of an arms race to be prevented. Naturally, moves that will clearly endanger the atmosphere of security and stability we are trying to establish in Europe cannot be viewed with tolerance. The points covered in Yeltsin's message should, therefore, be assessed by all CFE signatories, and especially NATO, with all their possible negative implications.

Russian Response

PM2909113993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Sep 93 First Edition p 4

[Maksim Yusin report: "Unexpected Friction Between Ankara and Moscow"]

[Text] The Turkish leadership has come out resolutely against Moscow's proposal to review certain provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of Conventional Armed Forces, which would allow Russia not to reduce the amount of its own combat equipment in the North Caucasus.

"Russia cannot unilaterally 'amend' the treaty, and Turkey does not agree to any changes to it," Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin stated. At the same time, the Turkish foreign policy department called on the NATO countries and other treaty participants to "attentively monitor the possible negative consequences of the Russian initiative."

This reaction from Ankara was greeted with surprise at the Russian Foreign Ministry. "Last week President Yeltsin sent a message to his Turkish counterpart, Suleyman Demirel, explaining Moscow's position. In his letter of reply Demirel noted that he understands Yeltsin's arguments that border defense is an internal matter for Russia and that Ankara does not see Moscow as a threat to its security," Bakhtiyar Khakimov, chief of the Foreign Ministry's Western Asia Administration, said.

According to information from Smolensk Square sources, similar messages from Yeltsin have been received by the leaders of the main Western states apart from Demirel. Russia's aim is to achieve a revision of the quotas set by the treaty, which was signed when the USSR still existed and does not reflect, Moscow believes, the current political realities.

The Kremlin is particularly concerned about the paragraph stipulating that by 1995 the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts (which account for more than half of the territory of the European part of Russia) will retain just 700 tanks, 580 armored combat vehicles, and 1,200 artillery systems. Given the tension in Russia's North Caucasus republics and the armed conflicts in the neighboring Transcaucasian states, Moscow can hardly agree to these quotas.

"We are talking about Russia's security. We do not threaten any of our neighbors. When the Turks have problems in Kurdistan, we do not even dream of counting how many tanks they have sent to the hot spots," an interlocutor at Smolensk Square noted. As he put it, Russia is counting on support from the United States and West Europe on this issue. "It is not ruled out that the Turkish Foreign Ministry's unexpectedly sharp reaction is linked to some kind of misunderstanding," he added.

UNITED KINGDOM

Plans for RAF's New Nuclear Missile Axed

LD1810160193 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1543 GMT 18 Oct 93

[By Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION defense correspondent]

[Text] Plans to develop a new nuclear missile for the RAF [Royal Air Force] have been scrapped saving around 1.5 billion pounds sterling in the cash-strapped defence budget, it was announced tonight.

Instead, Britain's sub-strategic nuclear deterrent will be provided by Trident submarine missiles fitted with a single warhead.

The decision means the RAF will eventually lose its nuclear role, which it has jealously guarded for 40 years.

The announcement by Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind in the Commons came as no surprise as officials have indicated for some time that it would no longer be financially viable to develop a missile to replace the RAF's free-fall nuclear bombs.

"Since the late 1980's the world's security circumstances have changed fundamentally. We have done a full reappraisal and concluded the requirement is not of a significantly high priority to justify it," said an official.

The Royal Navy has been working behind the scenes to prove that its Trident D-5 missiles can be used in both the strategic and sub-strategic roles.

It was originally planned to arm each Trident submarine with 16 missiles carrying a maximum of eight independently targeted warheads to defeat the world's most sophisticated missile defence systems in a strategic attack.

But Mr Rifkind explained that Britain needed to maintain a sub-strategic nuclear strike force to deter potential aggressors, who might be prepared to gamble that Britain would not launch an all-out nuclear attack.

A senior Ministry of Defence official said: "It is part of our overall war prevention system."

"It is an essential link between strategic nuclear weapons and conventional war - a clear demonstration that aggression is not a rational option."

It is widely feared that an increasing number of countries will develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

And a sub-strategic nuclear weapon is seen as the necessary deterrent against such nations.

The total cost of developing the missile known as the Tactical Air to Surface Missile (TASM) was estimated at about 1.8 billion pounds sterling.

Officials said the cost of using Trident in a sub-strategic role was "almost nothing" as all that was required was some new computer software and some shore construction at the Faslane submarine base on the Clyde.

It will not be necessary to develop a new warhead as all the Trident missiles - both strategic and sub-strategic - will be fitted with the same warhead.

However, Britain is retaining its capability to design, develop and produce new nuclear weapons in the future.

"We need to keep our options open," added the official.

INTERNATIONAL

Hans Blix Gets New Term as IAEA Chief

AU2809161693 Paris AFP in English 1544 GMT
28 Sep 93

[Text] Vienna, Sept 28 (AFP)—Hans Blix of Sweden, 65, was named on Tuesday to a fourth four-term term as head of Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an agency spokesman announced.

Blix, the only candidate, was re-elected by acclamation by the 114 members attending the IAEA general conference here, and was sworn in at once. He had been appointed last June by the Agency's board of governors as the only candidate to succeed himself.

The Swede, a former foreign minister, was first elected in 1981 as a compromise candidate. Persons close to him say he is particularly characterized by discretion, efficiency, and an ability to listen to the concerns of the various regional interests within his Agency.

Hans Blix is known as a low-key but efficient administrator.

The IAEA, during his tenure, has managed to respond to the increased demand for nuclear control and inspections, despite political problems such as the conflict with Iraq and disputes with North Korea, financial problems and the safety problems at nuclear plants in the old Soviet Bloc.

He is a native of Uppsala, Sweden, was trained in law and is a former Swedish foreign minister. He is fluent in French, English and German.

He sees himself as "handicapped" by lacking the sort of technical and scientific background of his predecessor, nuclear physicist Sigvard Eklund, who holds the record as IAEA chief with five terms between 1961 and 1981.

But Blix feels his broad political and diplomatic experience has compensated, and has won his praise among IAEA regional groups for what is seen as his readiness to hear all positions.

Blix has been instrumental in changing the way the Agency conducts its inspections.

Whereas beforehand it toured only nuclear sites declared by a country, the IAEA now requests inspections based on information supplied by intelligence services or the media concerning possible clandestine nuclear sites, as has been the case with Iraq and North Korea.

His worst criticism as IAEA chief came in May 1991 over an IAEA report that concluded that the consequences of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster were "overestimated." Blix himself conceded later that he had not been critical enough in assessing the report.

He is married and the father of two sons.

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